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Abstract 
 
Do “cultural factors” substantively influence the creation and evolution of 
property institutions? For the past several decades, few legal scholars have answered 
affirmatively. Those inclined towards a law and economics methodology tend to see 
property institutions as the outcome of self-interested and utilitarian bargaining, and 
therefore often question the analytical usefulness of “culture.” The major emerging 
alternative, a progressive literature that emphasizes the social embeddedness of 
property institutions and individuals, is theoretically more accommodating of cultural 
analysis but has done very little of it.  
 This Article develops a “cultural” theory of how property institutions are 
created and demonstrates that such a theory is particularly powerful in explaining 
large-scale institutional differences between societies. Empirically, it argues that, in 
the two centuries before large-scale industrialization, China, England, and Japan 
displayed systematic and fundamental differences in their regulation of property use 
and transfer. It further argues that these legal and institutional differences are best 
explained by certain aspects of social culture, specifically by the criteria for 
sociopolitical status distribution. Some of these criteria are distinctly “cultural” in the 
sense that they were probably generated by the widespread social internalization of 
moral values, rather than by utilitarian bargaining. 
 Cultural paradigms can exist, therefore, in property institutions. If we assume, 
as conventional law and economics urges, that individuals generally approach 
property use and regulation through a self-interested and utilitarian mindset, their 
pursuit of personal utility can nonetheless be constrained or empowered by cultural 
norms of status distribution that determine their relative bargaining power.   
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Introduction  
 
Do “cultural factors” substantively influence the creation and evolution of 
property institutions? For the past several decades, few legal scholars have answered 
affirmatively. Those inclined towards a law and economics methodology tend to see 
property institutions as the outcome of self-interested and utilitarian bargaining, and 
therefore often question the analytical usefulness of “culture”—defined here as social 
norms, values, and beliefs that are embraced and internalized without empirical 
discovery or analytical justification1—in understanding this process.2 The major 
emerging alternative, a progressive literature that emphasizes the social 
embeddedness of both property institutions and individuals, is in theory more 
accommodating of cultural analysis3 but has thus far done very little of it.4 In either 
case, the notion that “culture” can significantly influence property use and regulation 
has fallen by the wayside. 
 This Article develops a “cultural” theory of how property institutions are 
created and seeks to demonstrate that such a theory is particularly powerful—perhaps 
indispensable—in explaining large-scale institutional differences between societies. 
To this end, it argues that, in the two centuries before large-scale industrialization, 
China, England, and Japan displayed systematic and fundamental differences in their 
regulation of property use and transfer. It further argues that these legal and 
institutional differences are best explained by certain aspects of social culture, 
specifically by the criteria for sociopolitical status distribution. Some of these criteria 
                                                 
1 This definition of culture is drawn from Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A 
Historical and Theoretical Reflection of Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL. ECON. 912 (1994); 
Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law 
and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989).  
2 See literature reviews at, for example, Lauren B. Edelman, Rivers of Law Contested Terrain: A Law and 
Society Approach to Economic Rationality, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 181 (2004); Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, 
Building the Bridge from Both Sides of the River: Law and Society and Rational Choice, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 
207 (2004); Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion and History, 34 L. & SOC. REV. 157, 
158 (2000); Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 542 
(1998); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The Prospects for an Interdisciplinary 
Discourse on Law, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 389, 399, 400-02 (1997); Robert Cooter, Law and Unified Social 
Theory, 22 J.L. & SOC’Y. 50 (1995); and JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL 
SOCIAL SCIENCE 251-52 (1995). See also Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, Structure and Style in 
Comparative Property Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (Giovanni B. 
Ramello & Theodore Eisenberg eds., forthcoming), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2373377 (arguing for a functionalist theory of 
comparative property law); Robert C. Ellickson, The Twilight of Critical Theory: A Reply to Litowitz, 15 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 333 (2003) (criticizing certain cultural theories of property); Thomas E. Ulen, A Nobel 
Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 875 (2003) (arguing for “scientific” theories of law that parallel economics).       
3 A brief summary of progressive property’s core arguments is provided by Hanoch Dagan, Property’s 
Structural Pluralism: On Autonomy, the Rule of Law, and the Role of Blackstonian Ownership, in 3 
BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. (2014); and Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive 
Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009). The literature is surveyed at Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and 
Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 101 (2011).  
4 There are exceptions. E.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: 
LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE (2006); Anna di Robilant, Property: Bundle of Sticks or a 
Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 869 (2013).  
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are distinctly “cultural” in the sense that utilitarian, self-interested bargaining alone 
could not plausibly have created them. Instead, they were probably generated, in 
large part, by the widespread social internalization of moral values. 
 These historical arguments pave the way for a broader theoretical claim: 
“culture” is often a major determinant of property institutions, so much that we can 
actually identify societal “cultural paradigms” in property institutions. Even if we 
assume, as conventional law and economics urges, that individuals generally 
approach property use, alienation, and regulation through a self-interested and 
utilitarian mindset,5 their pursuit of perceived personal utility is nonetheless 
constrained or empowered by social norms of status distribution that determine their 
relative bargaining power. In fact, precisely because we assume that most people 
prefer property norms that advance their perceived self-interest, we also need to 
explain what happens when there is fundamental conflict between individual 
interests,6 and here cultural internalization is more critical than property scholars have 
commonly acknowledged.  
The Article first presents a straightforward social choice theory of property 
norm bargaining: the higher someone’s social and political status, the more capable 
they are of advancing their own norm preferences over the competing preferences of 
others. A society in which, for example, large landholders monopolize social and 
political positions of high status and prestige will have far more “rich-friendly” 
property norms than a society in which such positions are distributed somewhat 
equally between the rich and poor.  
Building on this basic observation, the Article then argues that different 
societies often have fundamentally different “status distribution criteria”—that is, the 
social norms that determine how individuals obtain social and political status: some 
societies rank individuals primarily by wealth, whereas others rank by electoral or 
social popularity, by academic achievement, by age and generational seniority, by 
hereditary bloodlines, or by caste systems.7 What status distribution criteria a society 
abides by has enormous consequences for the power balance between its various 
social groups and classes, and therefore great impact on its choice of property norms. 
What distinguishes this Article from other theories of property norm 
formation is, ultimately, its insistence that these “status distribution norms” are often 
cultural. It argues that purely utilitarian or functionalist theories of norm formation 
often fail to explain why different societies tend to adopt different status distribution 
norms. Instead, these differences are best explained by differences in social culture—
                                                 
5 See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO PENALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY, ch. 1 
(2012) (summarizing utilitarian property theory); Thomas W. Merrill, Property as Modularity, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 151, 152 (2012); GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976); ROBERT 
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (6th ed. 2011); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007); Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 1 (2001); Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476-80 (1997) (discussing bounded self-interest). 
6 This is something that mainstream property theory tends to overlook. See Katrina M. Wyman, From Fur to 
Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117 (2005).  
7 See Xiaotian Zhang, Status Inconsistency Revisited: An Improved Statistical Model, 24 EURO. SOC. REV. 
155, 156 (2008) (noting the complex factors that affect the calculation of social status).  
Cultural Paradigms in Property Institutions 5/27/2016 7:32 PM 
 
 
 
4 
 
social values that are systematically embraced and internalized, perhaps “taken for 
granted,” by large segments of the society as innately “right” and “moral,” and are 
not regularly re-justified or reexamined based on their material consequences. Some 
status distribution norms can, in fact, enjoy long-term popularity despite having 
strongly negative material consequences, whether for society as a whole or for many 
prominent individuals. Their longevity is understandable only if we accept that 
individuals can morally internalize certain status distribution norms that actually 
damage their material self-interest.8 
There is, therefore, a chain of causation from these cultural norms of status 
distribution to the power balance between different social classes, to the shape and 
substance of property institutions. In other words, property institutions can be 
determined by certain aspects of social culture. Should we ignore these cultural 
undertones, we risk confining ourselves to an incomplete understanding of how 
property institutions are created. In particular, we will struggle to explain why 
different societies have historically differed dramatically in some of their most 
important property institutions. 
 To illustrate this, this Article focuses on three major Western European and 
East Asian economies in the two centuries immediately before large-scale 
industrialization. It specifically examines how—and, more importantly, why—the 
property institutions that governed land mortgages differed from country to country. 
These were, in fact, some of the most economically significant norms in any 
preindustrial economy: short of selling land outright, mortgaging land was often the 
only way for the average landholder to obtain large sums of cash, something that 
became increasingly important with rapid commercialization. Creditors, on the other 
hand, relied heavily on mortgage default and the seizure of collateral to accumulate 
landed wealth. Given the very high stakes involved, debtors and creditors clashed 
fiercely over the legal and customary rules that governed these transactions: should 
they enforce mandatory redemption/repayment deadlines?9 If so, where should they 
set the deadline? What rights should they grant the creditor in case of default? 
The battle lines were similarly drawn in all three countries: the stereotypical 
land mortgagor everywhere was a cash-strapped smallholder who borrowed money 
from a richer neighbor and who almost always preferred property norms that allowed 
                                                 
8 Such acceptance is extremely commonplace in anthropological or sociological studies, see, e.g., LAW AND 
ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER (Sally F. Moore ed., 2005), and in the work of some political scientists, see, e.g., 
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, ROBERT LEONARDI & RAFAELLA NANETTI, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC 
TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993) (discussing the importance of civic culture to democratic governance). 
It is only in certain fields—microeconomics and political economy are the major ones—that this needs to be 
“proven,” rather than simply assumed. Property theory is, however, one of these, given its strongly law and 
economics-oriented methodology.  
9 Early modern mortgages, whether English, Chinese, or Japanese, generally gave the creditor a right of 
occupation and use over the collateral—in some cases, formal title—prior to full repayment, and therefore 
repayment was the same thing as redemption of the collateral. See discussion at infra pp. 34-43 (basically just 
Section A of Part III). The modern Anglo-American distinction between timely “repayment” and 
“redemption” during foreclosure only exists because of the rise of lien mortgages, in which the creditor has 
no property right prior to default and foreclosure. See DAVID A. SCHMUDDE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
MORTGAGES AND LIENS 7, 261-63 (2004).  
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him a longer period to redeem his mortgaged land.10 In comparison, larger, wealthier 
landholders generally played the role of creditor, and therefore fought hard to impose 
tight customary limits on redemption and harsh consequences on defaulters. The 
economic rationales underlying these entrenched positions were complex but fairly 
universal: essentially, land was so valuable in all these preindustrial agrarian 
economies that debtors desperately wanted to maximize their odds of redeeming the 
collateral, while creditors were no less eager to minimize those odds and maximize 
their own odds of seizing the collateral upon default.11  
Although the negotiation of mortgage norms tended to be a rich-versus-poor 
process almost everywhere, the actual laws and customs that emerged from this 
process were profoundly different from country to country: English norms were 
strongly pro-creditor and pro-rich, imposing extremely short deadlines on mortgage 
redemption and allowing creditors to permanently seize collateral immediately upon 
default. Chinese norms were almost unreasonably pro-debtor and pro-smallholder, 
allowing debtors to retain valid redemption rights for eternity—at virtually no 
interest—and therefore almost never risk permanent loss of the collateral. In-between 
these two extremes, Japanese norms resembled the English framework but usually 
gave debtors a longer period to repay.12 Correspondingly, both early modern England 
and Japan underwent periods of massive land concentration and growing inequality, 
with the English process being especially rapid and ruthless.13 China, however, 
experienced minimal land concentration in its pre-industrial history.14 
Why were Chinese smallholders so much more successful than their English 
and Japanese peers in securing favorable property rules, and why were English 
smallholders particularly unsuccessful? The historical evidence strongly suggests that 
these divergent outcomes had roots in the different sociopolitical status and power of 
smallholders in these societies: Chinese smallholders regularly occupied positions of 
high political authority in local communities, and therefore had the sociopolitical 
clout to win important property norm concessions from wealthier households.15 In 
comparison, large landholders enjoyed a virtual monopoly on high sociopolitical 
status in rural England and were therefore able to push through legal changes that 
aided their accumulation of land.16 Japanese local politics was likewise dominated by 
the rich, but not quite to the same extent.17 
                                                 
10 See discussion infra pp. 33-34. 
11 Id.  
12 See discussion infra pp. 34-43 (basically just Section A of Part III).  
13 See discussion surrounding infra note 144. 
14 See discussion surrounding infra note 166. 
15 See discussion infra pp. 47-49. For a more detailed treatment, see Taisu Zhang, Social Hierarchies and the 
Formation of Customary Property Law in Pre-Industrial China and England, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 171 (2014).  
16 See KEITH WRIGHTSON, ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1580-1680, at 43 (2003); H.R. French, Social Status, Localism 
and the ‘Middle Sort of People’ in England, 1620-1750, 166 PAST & PRESENT 66, 74 (2000).  
17 See discussion infra pp. 49-51. Detailed studies on Tokugawa social hierarchies include EDWARD E. PRATT, 
JAPAN'S PROTOINDUSTRIAL ELITE: THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF THE GONO (1999); HERMAN OOMS, 
TOKUGAWA VILLAGE PRACTICE: CLASS, STATUS, POWER, LAW (1996); KÄREN WIGEN, THE MAKING OF A 
JAPANESE PERIPHERY 1750-1920 (1995); THOMAS C. SMITH, THE AGRARIAN ORIGINS OF MODERN JAPAN 
(1959); Brian W. Platt, Elegance, Prosperity, Crisis: Three Generations of Tokugawa Village Elites, 55 
MONUMENTA NIPPONICA 45 (2000). 
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Up to this point, the historical account is completely compatible with 
conventional political economy theories of property norm formation: individuals tend 
to support norms that serve their economic self-interest, and those with higher 
sociopolitical status tend to get the norms they want. The account begins to diverge 
from utilitarian assumptions about social behavior, however, when we consider how 
high status individuals obtained that status in the first place. The divergence is 
primarily driven by the need to account for both cross-country differences and intra-
country homogeneity: one of the most striking things about the comparisons drawn 
above is that they were truly country-level differences. Within core Chinese 
macroregions, there was remarkably little regional variation in either mortgage norms 
or rich-poor power balances. The same can be said of Japan and England. 
Country-level differences deserve country-level explanations. The amount of 
ecological and economic diversity within each country, especially China, makes it 
exceedingly difficult to explain intra-country homogeneity without invoking some 
sort of country-level external influence. The usual solution—centralized legislation 
and regulation by the state—is largely inapplicable to these early modern societies, as 
they simply did not possess governments powerful enough to dictate local property 
institutions or social structures.18 Customs and social norms were the true sources of 
local property regulation.19 The question, therefore, is how decentralized self-
governance produced similar status distributions and property institutions across 
entire countries. 
Shared cultural values are likely the only plausible answer: there is much 
evidence to suggest that the different power balances between rich and poor in these 
countries was the systemic result of normative differences. Chinese society broadly 
embraced the Neo-Confucian social ideal that individuals should self-organize into 
large kinship networks and that social rank within those networks should be 
determined by age and generational seniority.20 In rural Japan, most communities 
believed that individuals drew their social status from both the status of their 
ancestors and from their own wealth.21 This created a system that eventually 
converged on ranking by wealth, but with some destitute households hanging onto 
high status—for a time—by virtue of former wealth. Early modern English society, in 
comparison, tended to allocate sociopolitical status based primarily on landed wealth, 
thereby excluding virtually all smallholders from positions of social authority.22 
Moreover, while it might be possible, if difficult, to argue that English or 
Japanese “status distribution criteria” were simply the result of utility maximization 
                                                 
18 England began modern state-building considerably earlier than China or Japan. See HE WENKAI, PATHS 
TOWARDS THE MODERN FISCAL STATE: ENGLAND, JAPAN, AND CHINA (2014). See generally STEVEN PINCUS, 
1688 THE FIRST MODERN REVOLUTION (2009) (describing England’s fifteenth century state-building). 
19 See discussion infra pp. 34-43 (basically just Section A of Part III). On the manipulation of formal law by 
Japanese villagers, see OOMS, supra note 17, at 222-42; and J. MARK RAMSEYER, ODD MARKETS IN JAPANESE 
HISTORY 26 (1996). For a detailed treatment of how Qing law was generally overrode by local custom, see 
Taisu Zhang, Property Rights in Land, Agricultural Capitalism, and the Relative Decline of Pre-Industrial 
China, 13 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 129, 168-74 (2011).  
20 See discussion infra pp. 47-49. For more detailed discussion, see Zhang, supra note 15. 
21 See discussion infra pp. 49-51. For more detailed discussion, see sources cited supra note 17. 
22 WRIGHTSON, supra note 16; French, supra note 16.  
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by local communities, it is almost certainly impossible to construct such an argument 
for China.23 There are few utilitarian advantages to ranking by age and generational 
seniority, and almost certainly none that could explain its dominance across such a 
vast and ecologically diverse country for at least six centuries. It is far more likely—
both more logically coherent and more empirically documentable—that the near-
universal embrace of Confucian kinship hierarchies was driven by widespread value-
internalization and moral agreement. 
There was, therefore, a chain of causation that linked distinctly cultural norms 
of status distribution to power balances between the rich and poor, and then to the 
creation of customary property institutions that reflected those power balances. This 
allows us to speak of “cultural paradigms” in the property institutions of these 
societies. We could ask, of course, why widespread moral internalization of cultural 
values happened in the first place, but the “why” questions must stop somewhere in 
this Article. Stopping at cultural values emphasizes the qualitative difference between 
moral internalization on the one hand, and, on the other, the utilitarian calculation of 
self-interest that property scholars usually associate with property use and regulation. 
Let me immediately acknowledge that there is perhaps nothing theoretically 
incompatible between the kind of cultural narrative advocated here and utilitarian 
assumptions of self-interested economic behavior: one could argue, for example, that 
value internalization simply alters individual utility functions, whereas 
microeconomic theory usually takes individual utility functions as given, rather than 
something to be explained.24 Certainly, this Article does not argue that utilitarian 
theories of property are wrong—it merely argues that they are incomplete without 
serious analysis of cultural values. If there are indeed paradigmatic, cultural 
differences in individual utility functions that explain societal institutional divergence, 
then surely we cannot be satisfied with a theory of property that simply takes those 
utility functions for granted. 
Another issue is whether we can take the cultural influence thesis even 
further—to argue that the very notion of property is inherently cultural, that the 
economic maximization of property is itself a cultural value, contingent upon societal 
internalization and acceptance. The major obstacle is that, in matters of basic 
economic production, land use, and even the negotiation of property norms, people 
behaved similarly pragmatically in all countries studied here. People in similar 
economic circumstances, whether English, Chinese, or Japanese, tended to prefer 
similar property norms and were indeed similarly vocal and aggressive about it.25 On 
the one hand, none of this disproves the, put somewhat crudely, all-economic-
                                                 
23 See discussion at infra pp. 52-64.  
24 Neoclassic versions of this assumption often assume utility functions to be not only exogenous, but also 
unchanging and universal. Cf. Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96 J. 
POL. ECON. 675 (1988); George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. 
ECON. REV. 76 (1977). But see David Krackhardt, Endogenous Preferences: A Structural Approach, in 
DEBATING RATIONALITY: NON-RATIONAL ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING 239 (Jennifer 
Halpern & Robert N. Stern eds., 1998); Robert A. Pollak, Habit Formation and Dynamic Demand Functions, 
78 J. POL. ECON. 745 (1970).  
25 See discussion infra pp. 33-34.  
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rationality-is-a-cultural-construct argument.26 On the other hand, however, it also 
fails to contradict the view that economic maximization of land resources is, 
essentially, human nature, especially in agrarian economies where land is the most 
important source of livelihood. Additional research may be capable of differentiating 
between these two positions, but this Article cannot.  
In other words, this Article attempts to establish a “lower bound” for the 
cultural analysis of how property institutions are created: at a minimum, cultural 
factors can significantly affect the creation of property institutions, and therefore 
deserve to be taken more seriously. This may be underselling the influence of cultural 
internalization over property institutions, but given how little work has been done in 
this direction—and how openly skeptical some leading scholars are of “culture” as an 
analytical unit27—it seems only prudent to take it one step at a time. 
The placement of the Article’s historical narrative in pre-industrial economies 
deserves some additional explanation. This is largely driven by empirical concerns: 
once China began large-scale industrialization in the 1950s, a number of factors 
emerged that make observation of cultural influences on property institutions 
considerably more difficult. The Communist party-state not only was vastly more 
powerful than its predecessors but also adhered to a political ideology of substantial 
foreign origin.28 This makes it highly difficult to distinguish transplanted ideas from 
indigenous ones, superficial institutions from substantively effective ones, and 
utilitarian calculations from internalized values. A somewhat similar 
transformation—expansion of state authority coupled with elite embracement of 
foreign political ideologies—occurred in Japan after the Meiji Revolution.29 
Essentially, it is much easier to structurally analyze pre-industrial East Asian societies 
than industrialized ones. Picking the low-hanging empirical fruit first does not, 
however, necessarily damage the theoretical claim the Article attempts to illustrate. 
Moreover, pre-industrial societies are not necessarily pre-modern, especially when 
they are highly commercialized, privatized, and populated by aggressively wealth-
maximizing individuals.30  
                                                 
26 For major works that have made this argument see, among others, MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM 
AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (W.D. Halls trans., 2000) (1925); KARL POLANYI, THE 
GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 
Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1968); J.I. Prattis, Synthesis, or a New Problematic in Economic Anthropology, 
11 THEORY AND SOCIETY 205-28 (1982); and STEPHEN GUDEMAN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF ECONOMY 
COMMUNITY, MARKET, AND CULTURE (2001).  
27 E.g., RAMSEYER, supra note 20, at 7; Ellickson, supra note 2. 
28 Local histories that document the expansion of state power under the PRC include, for example, EDWARD 
FRIEDMAN, PAUL G. PICKOWICZ & MARK SELDEN, CHINESE VILLAGE, SOCIALIST STATE (1991); and ANITA 
CHAN, RICHARD MADSEN & JONATHAN UNGER, CHEN VILLAGE UNDER MAO AND DENG: EXPANDED AND 
UPDATED EDITION (1992).  
29 DANIEL V. BOTSMAN, PUNISHMENT AND POWER IN THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN (2005); ANDREW 
GORDON, A MODERN HISTORY OF JAPAN: FROM TOKUGAWA TIMES TO THE PRESENT 61-77, 94-138 (2d ed. 
2003); CONRAD TOTMAN, A HISTORY OF JAPAN 322-67 (2000).  
30 There have been endless debates on when China and Japan entered the “modern era,” with some placing 
the Chinese transition as early as the tenth century. See, e.g., VALERIE HANSEN, THE OPEN EMPIRE: A 
HISTORY OF CHINA THROUGH 1600, at 3-14 (2000); Robert M. Hartwell, Demographic, Political, and Social 
Transformations of China, 750-1550, 42 HARV. J. ASIATIC STUD. 365 (1982). On Japan, see BOTSMAN, supra 
note 29; and Arland Thornton, The Developmental Paradigm, Reading History Sideways, and Family Change, 
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A final word about terminology: as noted above, “culture,” in this Article, 
refers to social norms, values, and beliefs that are commonly embraced and 
internalized without empirical discovery or analytical justification. This is the 
definition most commonly adopted by law and economics scholars or institutional 
economists, but is also substantially narrower than the conventional definition in 
legal anthropology. There, as one prominent anthropologist once put it, “culture is all,” 
and encompasses “durable customs, ideas, values, habits, and practices.”31 The 
problem with this more expansive definition of “culture” is that it potentially 
incorporates many social phenomena that are actually equilibrium outcomes of self-
interested bargaining. Defining “culture” as internalized norms and values does, at 
the very least, distinguish it from conscious, utilitarian calculations of self-interest. 
The remainder of the Article is structured as follows: Part I discusses how and 
why cultural analysis has been absent from modern theories of how property 
institutions are created. Part II outlines a “cultural” theory that largely complements, 
rather than contradicts, these preexisting schools of thought. Parts III and IV then 
demonstrate its applicability to mortgage institutions in pre-industrial China, Japan, 
and England. Part III argues that distributions of sociopolitical status exerted 
tremendous influence over these mortgage institutions. Part IV then identifies the 
specific social hierarchies that underlay these status distribution patterns, and argues 
that some of them were the product of cultural internalization. The Conclusion offers 
further theoretical discussion and some preliminary thoughts on how the theoretical 
insights developed here can be applied to contemporary societies. 
A quick note on the ordering of Parts III and IV: as a matter of causation, the 
material in Part IV precedes that in Part III, in that the “chain of causation” I argue 
for runs from cultural norms to status distribution patterns to property institutions. I 
have found, however, that it is generally easier to work backwards—from the 
phenomenon back to the explanation—when arguing for historical causation. Hence, 
I start with a description of mortgage institutions in Part III, identify the status 
distribution patterns that underlay them, and then work my way back to cultural 
norms in Part IV. 
I. The Absence of “Culture” in Property Theory 
A. “Culture” in Economic Theories of Property  
 
As more than one scholar has observed, contemporary property theory is 
dominated by law and economics.32 None of the field’s major debates in recent 
decades, including its close involvement in the law and social norms literature during 
the 1990s and early 2000s and the ongoing debate over the divisibility of property,33 
                                                                                                                                     
38 DEMOGRAPHY 449 (2001).  
31 Sally Falk Moore, Certainties Undone: Fifty Turbulent Years of Legal Anthropology, 1949-1999, in LAW 
AND ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER 346, 347, supra note 8.  
32 ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 5.  
33 For surveys of the social norms literature, see Ellickson, supra note 2; Etzioni, supra note 2; and Richard H. 
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have unfolded without heavy, and in some cases near-exclusive, reliance on 
economic analysis. This is especially true of those parts of the field that study the 
creation and evolution of property institutions. Most theories on this issue are 
constructed upon the basic behavioral assumption that individuals seek to maximize 
some unitary measure of personal utility, often assumed to correlate closely with 
wealth.34 This self-interested mindset then determines both their reaction to 
preexisting property institutions and, when given the ability to change or create such 
institutions, their preferences and bargaining strategy. In particular, people will 
support those property institutions that they believe will generate the most expected 
personal utility. 
This section argues that “culture,” defined here as internalized social values, 
has been largely invisible in the economic analysis of how property institutions are 
created and that this absence is very likely due to the strong methodological 
individualism of mainstream economic analysis. To make this argument, it is helpful 
to first look beyond property theory per se, towards broader, more abstract, 
discussions and surveys of law and economics methodology. It is primarily in this 
latter category that scholars have explicitly considered—and sometimes expressly 
rejected—the analytical potential of cultural internalization. 
At a 1989 symposium on “Post-Chicago Law and Economics,” Robert 
Ellickson suggested two ways in which law and economics might move beyond the 
strict rational actor model that, at the time, dominated the field.35 Discussing the field 
in general, but with a constant eye towards property theory, Ellickson outlined both a 
“psychological” approach and a “sociological” approach. The former would introduce 
“innate” cognitive biases into models of economic and legal behavior, whereas the 
latter would examine how “social forces influence human behavior,” particularly how 
they “may shape a person’s internal tastes for particular outcomes.”36 These forces 
are also referred to as “culture” and the process by which they influence individual 
preferences as “the internalization of culture.”37 Looking forward, Ellickson argued 
that scholarship based only on rational actor models would face “diminishing returns” 
and that scholars should “investigate . . . two notions: the frailty of human cognition 
and the possibility of a self-enforced altruism arising from the influence of culture.”38 
The primary difference between Ellickson’s “psychological” and 
“sociological” approaches appears to be the difference between universal, innate 
                                                                                                                                     
McAdams, Comment, Accounting for Norms, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 625. For surveys of the ongoing debate 
over the “bundle of rights” metaphor, see Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of 
Progressive Property, 101 CAL. L. REV. 107, 145-66 (2013) (surveying progressive ideas on the structure of 
property rights); Daniel B. Klein & John Robinson, Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the Property 
Symposium, 8 ECON J. WATCH 193 (2011); and Eric R. Claeys, Bundle-of-Sticks Notions in Legal and 
Economic Scholarship, 8 ECON J. WATCH 205 (2011) (surveying the law and economics branch of this 
debate).  
34 See sources cited supra note 5. 
35 See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical 
Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989).  
36 Id. at 44. 
37 Id. at 45. 
38 Id. at 55. 
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behavioral tendencies and highly localized cultural norms that must be learned and 
digested. We would not expect English communities to share the same cultural norms 
as Korean ones, but we might expect that both display risk aversion, endowment 
effects, and framing effects. There is, of course, room for overlap and interaction 
between the two approaches, as evidenced by the growing body of scholarship on 
“cultural cognition,” which examines how certain cognitive biases, such as framing 
effects, reinforce cultural differences between social groups.39 
In retrospect, Ellickson’s prescriptions appear to have been, more or less, 
half-embraced: Since the early 1990s, cognitive psychology and behavioral 
economics has indeed come to assume a commanding position within law and 
economics, to the point where scholars could begin talking about “what comes after 
victory for behavioral law and economics.”40 The second prong—that law and 
economics also investigate “the influence of culture”—has, however, met with a 
much more muted response. A number of more recent field surveys have noted that 
sociological approaches to legal scholarship remained “largely unexplored” in 
general, and had virtually no import on law and economics in particular.41   
Theories of how property institutions are created and evolve prove no 
exception to these general observations. They have encompassed a tremendous 
variety of topics in recent years—covering the spectrum from social norms to formal 
laws and regulations, from the “core” characteristics of property to specific rules 
regulating use and alienation—but have generally done so without employing what 
Ellickson would recognize as sociological methods or cultural theories of human 
behavior. A major recent article by Henry Smith argues, for example, that “both the 
mind and the law can be regarded as information-processing devices that manage 
complexity and economize on information by employing concepts and rules, the 
specific-over-general principle, modularity, and recursiveness.”42 This leads Smith to 
argue elsewhere that different legal systems tend to produce functionally similar 
property institutions because, at some fundamental level, they are all designed to help 
individuals manage and reduce the information costs inherent in property use and 
transaction.43 Lee Anne Fennell likewise acknowledges that, in her view, “property’s 
core debates” generally “boil down … to a question of production functions and 
                                                 
39 See generally The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, http://www.culturalcognition.net/ (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2015).  
40 Russell Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law and Economics?, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1653. Studies on how cognitive biases influence the creation of property norms include, for example, Henry 
E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PAPA. L. REV. 2097 (2012); Russel Korobkin, The 
Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003); and Lee A. Fennell, Homeownership 
2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047 (2008). See also Eric A. Kades, A Positive Theory of Eminent Domain (William 
& Mary Law Sch., Working Paper, No. 08-08, 2008). 
41 Edelman, supra note 2, at 182. A similar observation is found in Robert Cooter, Law and Unified Social 
Theory, 22 J.L. & SOC’Y. 50 (1995). A recent attempt by Menachem Mautner to systematically survey works 
on “law and culture” reveals quite a bit of work done by scholars trained in sociological or anthropological 
methods, but hardly any that incorporates significant amounts of economic analysis. Menachem Mautner, 
Three Approaches to Law and Culture, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 839 (2011).  
42Smith, supra note 40. 
43 Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law Property, 88 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2012). 
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nonlinearities”44 and that property norms are therefore created and transformed in 
response to objective economic necessities. In both articles, the driving force behind 
the creation of property rights—information costs inherent in property use or the 
nonlinearity of production functions—exists largely independently of sociocultural 
context.  
Other works explain the creation of property institutions through models or 
narratives that make no mention of “cultural factors” but are also not categorically 
incompatible with their existence. For example, in a 2009 article on the origins of 
property rights, James Krier considers two different but somewhat overlapping 
models of human behavior: a “biological model” in which human preferences on 
property rights are “product[s] of biological evolution”45—and therefore “genetically 
predetermined”46 for any given individual; and a “human model” in which 
individuals consciously choose how to behave based on personal cost-benefit analysis, 
but nonetheless have “have some ‘‘innate sense of possession and territory.’”47 
Although value internalization is never mentioned in either model, it could 
conceivably play some role, at least, in shaping the personal preferences that shape 
cost-benefit analysis. The same is true of Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky’s 
recent attempts to construct a “unified theory of property,” in which property norms 
are primarily designed to “defend the value”—defined here as social welfare or 
utility—“in stable ownership.”48 There is, logically, the possibility that individual 
compositions of value or utility could vary depending on sociocultural context, but 
the authors do not pursue this line of inquiry. 
If we turn our attention away from these “core debates” over the nature and 
origin of property, and towards the economic analysis of how specific rules and 
norms are created, “the influence of culture” is similarly indiscernible. Recent articles 
that seek to explain, for example, zoning laws, land demarcations, probate reforms, or 
the rule against perpetuities all adhere to traditional assumptions about individual 
economic and political rationality and, perhaps correspondingly, pay very little 
attention to the possibility of value internalization.49  
                                                 
44 Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1984 (2012).  
45 James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 152 
(2009). 
46 Id. at 154. 
47 Id. at 155 (quoting ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, Co-OPERATION and Welfare 107 (1986)). 
48 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 531 (2005).  
49 See, e.g., Vicki Been et al., Urban Land Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth 
Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227 (2014); Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1641 (2011); Gary D. Libecap, Dean Lueck & Trevor O’Grady, Large Scale Institutional Changes: 
Land Demarcation in the British Empire, 54 J.L. & ECON. 295 (2011); David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 
122 YALE L.J. 1670 (2013); James R. Hines Jr., Rational Choice and the Rule Against Perpetuities (Univ. 
Mich. L. Sch., Working Paper, 2015); James R. Hines Jr., Workshop Presentation at University of Chicago 
Law School: Rational Intestacy and Probate Reform (Feb. 2013); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, 
Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 
356 (2005). In fact, if one were to comb through all the property law-focused papers presented at the past 
twelve American Law and Economics Association annual meetings, one would be hard pressed to find any 
paper that seriously engages with the notion of internalized cultural values and mores. See Annual Meeting, 
AM. L. & ECON. ASS’N, http://www.amlecon.org/alea-meeting.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).  
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What explains this general reluctance to engage in sociocultural analysis? 
Ellickson himself offers perhaps the best explanation: writing in 1998 on the 
“discovery” of social norms by the legal academy, Ellickson appeared to reconsider 
his earlier willingness to incorporate sociological methods.50 He put forth a brief but 
compelling explanation for why sociological methods had been, and would probably 
continue to be, unappealing to law and economics: sociologists were “unable to 
coalesce around a dominant paradigm” of human behavior.51 More importantly, their 
tendency to see “informal groups and cultures as operative engines . . . bewilders 
economists and other devotees of methodological individualism.”52 In other words, 
sociologists all too often failed to explain the individual incentives and decisions 
behind group activity or norm creation, instead choosing to present them “as is”—and 
this was, in Ellickson’s view, incompatible with the economist’s need to explain 
economic or social phenomenon as the aggregate of logically coherent individual 
behavior models. In many ways, this may also explain why law and economics 
scholars have been far more accepting of cognitive science: despite their many 
challenges to rational actor models, behavioral biases manifest as innate individual 
biases, which can then be aggregated onto the group level. In comparison, treating 
“groups” or “cultures” as “operative engines” may feel insufficiently rigorous or 
coherent, even lazy. 
But while legal scholars have generally declined to introduce cultural factors 
into the economic analysis of property institutions—or perhaps into law and 
economics in general—if we look beyond the confines of the legal academy, there 
have actually been some very serious, if ultimately problematic, attempts at 
incorporating “culture” into institutional economics. In fact, several pioneers of the 
New Institutional Economics, including Harold Demsetz, Douglass North, and Oliver 
Williamson, were open to the possibility that cultural factors could significantly 
influence the creation and evolution of political and legal institutions, including, and 
perhaps especially, property institutions. Demsetz, in his seminal article on the origin 
of property norms, hypothesized that property institutions could depend very much 
on a “community’s taste” for collectivism.53 North and Williamson both acknowledge 
the potential existence of “Level 1” “norms, customs, mores, traditions, etc.” that are 
socially embedded and change extremely slowly.54 These “Level 1” norms then affect 
the formation of lower level institutions—property and contract institutions, for 
example—that regulate economic activity more directly. At one point, North poses 
the question: “[w]hat is it about informal constraints that gives them such a pervasive 
                                                 
50 See Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, supra note 2. 
51 Id. at 542. 
52 Id.  
53 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967). Note that this does 
not necessarily amount to a substantive account of how property rights are created. Instead, Demsetz is 
simply discussing a few hypothetical possibilities. See Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of 
Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 289 (1979) (discussing Demsetz).  
54 Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 
595, 596 (2000); see also Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 97 (1991) (discussing the 
basic assumptions of institutional economics).  
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influence upon the long-run character of economies?”55 Neither he nor Williamson 
provides an answer. The great majority of institutional economists, in Williamson’s 
assessment, simply take these norms “as given.”56 
There have, however, been some significant exceptions. In 1994, for example, 
Avner Greif published a widely-discussed paper on how differences in “cultural 
beliefs—defined as “ideas . . . that are not empirically discovered or analytically 
proven”—led medieval Maghribi and Genoese trader societies down “distinct 
institutional trajectories.”57 He argued that the Maghribis shared a religious belief that 
all members of the same umma (“nation”) were responsible for one another, whereas 
the Christian Genoese were far more individualistic in both their religious beliefs and 
social behavior. These “cultural” differences led Genoese merchants to compensate 
for their relative lack of social capital by creating formal legal and administrative 
institutions, whereas the Maghribis could rely on informal collective enforcement 
mechanisms to impose social and moral sanctions against “deviants.”  
Greif’s study inspired a moderate number of follow-up studies, most of which 
attempt to identify correlations and potential causal relations between “culture”—
often dissected into measures of trust, individualism, and hierarchy, but also 
sometimes equated with major religions such as Islam, Catholicism, or 
Protestantism—and various institutional or economic outcomes.58 Several of these 
focus specifically on the connection between “cultural factors” and property 
institutions: some have argued that Catholic and Islamic countries offer weaker 
protection of private property,59 while others suggest that societies with higher levels 
of social trust and individualism offer stronger protection.60 In aggregate, these 
studies constitute a small but notable subset of recent institutional economics work. 
As discussed above, however, they have yet to make much of an imprint either on 
law and economics in general, or on what one might call the law and economics 
branch of property theory. 
B. Alternative Schools of Thought 
 
Although law and economics remains, even in the eyes of its critics, the 
“dominant” school in property theory, it is hardly the only school. The major 
emerging alternative, a “progressive” school that criticizes law and economics for 
focusing on “efficiency” as “the sole means of evaluating laws and establishing 
                                                 
55 North, supra note 54, at 111. 
56 Williamson, supra note 54, at 596. 
57 Greif, supra note 1, at 914. 
58 See Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222 (1999); Rene M. Stulz & 
Rohan Williamson, Culture, Openness, and Finance, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 313 (2003); Amir N. Licht et al., 
Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 659 
(2007); Mariko J. Klasing, The Cultural Roots of Institutions (Univ. of St. Gallen, Working Paper Series, 
2008); Guido Tabellini, Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe, 8 J. 
EUROPEAN ECON. ASS. 677 (2010); Claudia R. Williamson & Carrie B. Kerekes, Securing Private Property: 
Formal Versus Informal Institutions, 54 J. LAW & ECON. 537 (2011); Claudia R. Williamson, Culture and the 
Cost of Contract Enforcement, working paper (Miss. State Univ., March 6, 2014).  
59 La Porta et al., supra note 58.  
60 Licht et al., supra note 58, at 663; Williamson & Kerekes, supra note 58.  
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property norms,”61 is, in fact, highly compatible with cultural analysis at a theoretical 
level. For the most part, however, it has been a normative literature and has shown 
relatively little interest in producing an actual descriptive account of how cultural 
factors influence the creation of property institutions. 
This is not to say that “progressive property” has made no statement on how 
and why property institutions are created: as several of its major figures have stated, 
it seeks to examine the “underlying human values that property serves and the social 
relationships it shapes and reflects.”62 Such an examination, they argue, will show 
that “property implicates plural and incommensurable values.”63  This stands in 
contrast to the economic analysis of property, which, as progressive scholars 
correctly observe, generally applies one all-encompassing value—usually “utility,” 
and most often measured in monetary terms. Some progressive scholars prefer to 
discuss these plural values under a unified conceptual blanket—“freedom,” or 
“flourishing”—but they nonetheless insist that these blankets are “irreducibly plural 
concept[s],”64 and must take into account the variety of “preferences, values and 
commitments” that people may adopt.65 They also recognize “the significant role that 
our social values play in our conception of property,” and that property institutions 
can “vary . . . according to the social context.”66 To quote Hanoch Dagan, “[e]ach of 
our property institutions, as noted, targets a specific set of values to be promoted by 
its constitutive rules in one subset of social life . . . .”67 Unfortunately, Dagan does 
not specify how property institutions came to assume these promotional functions. 
“Progressive property” is, therefore, theoretically consistent with the 
possibility that “social culture” can play a significant role in the creation of property 
institutions, and would probably welcome the existence of “cultural paradigms” in 
property institutions. An empirical account that demonstrates how different societies 
construct property institutions based on different internalized values would not only 
demonstrate the value of cultural analysis but also provide serious support for the 
progressive claim of value pluralism and its belief in the existence of more than just 
one paradigm of property.68 
For now, these possibilities remain largely unexplored. Over the past decade 
or so, the progressive literature has been consistently more normative than descriptive; 
its major works have usually shown more interest in either presenting progressive 
property as a prescription for future institutional design or in demonstrating its 
philosophical appeal than in demonstrating its empirical superiority to economic 
                                                 
61 Rosser, supra note 33, at 110, see also HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011); 
Alexander, supra note 3; Rosser, supra note 33.  
62 Alexander et al., supra note 3, at 743. 
63 Id. 
64 AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 585 (2002).  
65 JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 126 
(2010).  
66 Dagan, supra note 3, at 7. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 12-13.  
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accounts.69 To the extent that their preferred objectives require some descriptive basis, 
they tend to quickly outline a couple of case studies, but rarely attempt more 
systematic empirical analysis.70 Even those works that claim to “begin[] with a 
straightforward descriptive observation”71 rarely go beyond the case study level and, 
even at that level, rarely seek to systematically demonstrate that their preferred 
interpretative framework is objectively more plausible than law and economics-
oriented alternatives. Some progressive scholars do employ some variation of 
intellectual history, where they demonstrate that leading intellectuals, jurists, or 
politicians of certain eras wrote and thought about property in ways that lend support 
to their arguments, but one can easily question whether high-level intellectual history 
is truly reflective of ground-level socioeconomic realities.72 
Consequently, the progressive literature and the law and economics approach 
have tended to operate at somewhat different levels of empirical detail and scope, 
which occasionally can give their debates an apples-to-oranges quality.73 There is 
certainly nothing wrong with being more normative than descriptive, especially in the 
early stages of developing a school of thought, but for the purposes of this article, the 
current progressive literature offers some general theoretical compatibility with 
cultural analysis, but quite little in theoretical specifics or empirical support.74 
Apart from the progressive literature, the most influential alternative in 
property theory to economic analysis is probably Margaret Jane Radin’s “personhood” 
theory, which emphasizes the emotional and perhaps spiritual investment in property 
ownership that conventional microeconomics often fails to capture.75 Similar to the 
progressive literature, the personhood theory is potentially compatible with cultural 
analysis: at the very least, it seems to tolerate the possibility that different cultural 
values could lead to different levels and kinds of emotional investment. Also similar 
to the progressive literature, however, is the lack of empirical exploration of this 
possibility. More recently, Radin’s work has taken on pluralist tendencies that 
strongly resemble the progressive school, to the point where some scholars have 
begun to consider her part of it.76 
                                                 
69 Alexander, supra note 3, at 102, 107 (outlining the primary normative agendas of pluralist property theory). 
70 E.g., JOSEPH W. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 19-55 (2000).  
71 Dagan, supra note 3, at 28.   
72 PURDY, supra note 65; Anna di Robilant, Property and Democratic Deliberation: The Numerus Clausus 
Principle and Democratic Experimentalism in Property Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 367 (2014).  
73 See, e.g., Rosser, supra note 33 (discussing the still ongoing debate over whether exclusion is an innate 
feature of property). The progressive side has, I think it is fair to say, not been operating at quite the same 
level of empirical ambition that the law and economics side has been. Cf. Chang & Smith, supra note 43, 
with Robilant, supra note 72. 
74 There have, of course, been several synthetic works of legal history that seem to lend some support to 
progressive theories of property: LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 2005); and 
STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY (2011) are perhaps the best examples. But even here, serious cultural 
analysis is largely missing. Friedman’s book, of course, covers the entirety of American legal history, and can 
therefore discuss the history of property only in a highly abbreviated manner. Banner, on the other hand, 
ultimately emphasizes technological advancement as the major driver of legal change—a surprisingly 
Demsetz-ian conclusion.  
75 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). 
76 Alexander, supra note 3, at 116-19. 
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C. Finding Room for Cultural Analysis 
 
  All in all, the major schools of modern property theory have thus far devoted 
very little substantive attention to the potential influence cultural factors exert over 
the creation of property institutions, even though their basic theoretical frameworks, 
including those based on law and economics, are often compatible with this 
possibility: like most forms of microeconomic analysis, law and economics usually 
claims to maximize subjective “utility,” for which wealth is only a measure or a 
proxy. Utility functions, however, are often taken to be exogenous, and beyond the 
scope of economic analysis.77 It is theoretically possible, at least, to fold what 
Ellickson calls the “internalization of cultural values” into these black box-like utility 
functions. In other words, cultural analysis studies how utility functions are formed, 
whereas economic analysis takes those functions for granted.  
 This cannot, however, constitute a valid reason for property scholars to ignore 
“the influence of culture.” Property theory seeks to explain how property institutions 
are formed, not merely to explore those parts of the process that lend themselves most 
naturally to conventional microeconomic analysis. Economists may well limit 
themselves to a certain methodology, but property scholars as a group—if not 
necessarily as individuals—should not do so unless they are reasonably sure that the 
methodology can produce something close to a complete understanding of 
institutional formation. Our subject is property itself, not the methodology. 
 Ellickson, as noted above, once cited the inaccessibility of sociology as an 
explanation for why cultural analysis has been unpopular with economically-minded 
legal scholars.78 This may well be true, but it, too, falls short of providing an actual 
justification: if preexisting sociological studies of social culture have not offered 
coherent accounts of individual-level behavior, then the best academic response is to 
try and provide one, not to despair of the possibility. In fact, the institutional 
economics literature discussed above, particularly Greif’s work, demonstrates that it 
is quite possible to build individual-level theories of human behavior that take 
sociocultural factors into account. 
 A potentially more compelling way to reject cultural analysis is to empirically 
argue that—irrespective of societal context, geographical region, and historical era—
individuals generally approached the creation and modification of property 
institutions through similarly self-interested and utilitarian mindsets: Because we do 
not observe major societal variation in individual approaches to property regulation, 
there is apparently no reason to believe that “culture,” which is innately society and 
region-specific, significantly influenced those approaches. A few major property 
articles have, in fact, experimented with this strategy: Henry Smith and Yun-chien 
Chang, for example, have recently argued that common law and civil law countries—
which actually encompass most of the world’s largest legal systems—possess 
                                                 
77 See Stigler and Becker, supra note 24, at 88. 
78 Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, supra note 2.  
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“remarkably similar” property institutions “for functional reasons.”79 Ellickson, too, 
pursued a somewhat similar line of argument in his seminal “Property in Land” 
article, in which he argues that landowners across a considerable variety of human 
societies adapted customary property institutions to economic, demographic and 
ecological conditions in similarly wealth-maximizing ways.80 Lending additional 
support to these arguments, a considerable number of legal and economic historians 
have recently demonstrated that individual patterns of property use tended to be 
similarly wealth-maximizing, rational, and industrious across many historical 
societies, both Western and Asiatic.81  
 Nonetheless, these empirical observations do not constitute sufficient reason 
to reject the “influence of culture.” They remain compatible with at least two 
different theories of cultural influence: first, they do not rule out the possibility that 
“economically utilitarian property use and regulation” is itself a cultural or social 
construct.82 They do mitigate against this argument—if only because they make it 
more difficult to explain why these otherwise very different societies eventually 
constructed similar cultures of individual economic behavior—but they do not do so 
very decisively. For example, one could hypothesize that only those societies that 
develop such an economic culture are likely to reach a certain level of size and 
economic complexity83 and that the historical studies discussed above focus, by 
design, on very large and complex civilizations. If we turn our attention, as many 
anthropologists have, to smaller, less economically developed societies, we might be 
                                                 
79 Chang & Smith, supra note 43, at 1-2. 
80 Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993). 
81 On the basic economic rationality of Chinese farmers, see LI BOZHONG, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN 
JIANGNAN, 1620-1850, at 107-08 (1998); THOMAS BUOYE, MANSLAUGHTER, MARKETS AND MORAL ECONOMY: 
VIOLENT DISPUTES OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CHINA 94 (2000); KENNETH POMERANZ, 
THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: CHINA, EUROPE, AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD ECONOMY 86-87 (2000); 
and Lynda S. Bell, Farming, Sericulture, and Peasant Rationality in Wuxi County in the Early Twentieth 
Century, in CHINESE HISTORY IN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 207, 226-29, 232-39 (Thomas G. Rawski & Lillian 
M. Li eds., 1992). On English economic behavior, see JOHN BROAD, TRANSFORMING ENGLISH RURAL SOCIETY: 
THE VERNEYS AND THE CLAYDONS, 1600-1820 (2004) (examining the rural entrepreneurship of gentry 
families); and JAN DE VRIES, THE INDUSTRIOUS REVOLUTION: CONSUMER BEHAVIOR AND THE HOUSEHOLD 
ECONOMY, 1650 TO THE PRESENT (2008). On Japanese economic behavior, see PRATT, supra note 17; SMITH, 
supra note 17; Masayuki Tanimoto, The Role of Tradition in Japan’s Industrialization: Another Path to 
Industrialization, in THE ROLE OF TRADITION IN JAPAN'S INDUSTRIALIZATION 3 (Masayuki Tanimoto ed., 2006); 
T.J. Byres, The Agrarian Question, Forms of Capitalist Agrarian Transition and the State: An Essay with 
Reference to Asia, 14 SOC. SCIENTIST 3 (1986); and Osamu Saito, Land, Labour and Market Forces in 
Tokugawa Japan, 24 CONTINUITY & CHANGE 169 (2009). On economic behavior and political economy in 
the Ottoman Empire, see TIMUR KURAN, THE LONG DIVERGENCE: HOW ISLAMIC LAW HELD BACK THE MIDDLE 
EAST 3-24 (2010); and ALAN MIKHAIL, NATURE AND EMPIRE IN OTTOMAN EGYPT 1-38 (2011).  
82 Apart from sources cited at supra note 26, see also DAVID GREWAL, THE INVENTION OF THE ECONOMY: THE 
ORIGINS OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT (forthcoming 2015) (discussing the sociopolitical foundations of modern 
economic thinking). [AU: This book has not been published.  Please provide a copy if possible.  David 
doesn’t want precirculation of drafts—I suggest you either ask him directly or just trust me that the 
book is relevant.] 
83 This would be somewhat similar to the “cultural determinacy” arguments made in WILLIAM H. MCNEILL, 
THE RISE OF THE WEST: A HISTORY OF THE HUMAN COMMUNITY (1963); E. L. JONES, THE EUROPEAN MIRACLE: 
ENVIRONMENTS, ECONOMIES AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE HISTORY OF EUROPE AND ASIA (2d ed. 1981); and 
DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS: WHY SOME ARE SO RICH AND SOME SO POOR 
(1998).  
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tempted to believe that many individuals and societies do not approach property use 
from a utilitarian mind set.84 
 The second possibility, which is the one this Article explores in detail, is that 
individual utilitarianism in property use can coexist with cultural internalization in 
other areas of social behavior. This is, in fact, the strategy that Greif and some of his 
fellow institutional economists have adopted. Greif, for example, appears to believe 
that social compactness and individualism were internalized values, whereas 
economic institutions such as contracts or formal court systems were created via 
utilitarian calculations.85 This hearkens back to North and Williamson’s identification 
of different “levels” of human institutions.86  
 As discussed above, property theory has largely declined to embrace this 
particular strand of institutional economics. This may have something to do with the 
flawed execution in these studies: somewhat surprisingly, Greif makes no serious 
attempt to explain why compactness and individualism were truly “cultural” 
characteristics.87 Could these tendencies have emerged for reasons other than value or 
belief internalization? Greif does not address this concern, nor do the follow-up 
studies discussed above.  Some, in fact, attempt to draw correlations between 
religious systems and belief internalization in even broader strokes than Greif.88  
 Timur Kuran’s recent work offers a refreshing departure from these 
tendencies: Kuran’s 2011 manuscript on the “Long Divergence” between Western 
Europe and the Middle East has drawn its share of critics,89 but at the very least, it 
makes a serious and well-documented attempt to argue that “certain institutions of 
great significance for investment, productivity, and exchange were grounded in 
Islamic teachings.”90 His efforts demonstrate, at least, that these specific 
shortcomings in Greif’s work need not dissuade scholars from accepting its broader 
insight that cultural factors can fruitfully coexist with both methodological 
individualism and the belief that human beings generally approach property use 
through a materialistic and utilitarian mindset. 
 One major common theme that emerges from this institutional economics 
literature is its general reliance on comparative methods. Comparative strategies, 
especially those that compare how different property systems deal with similar 
economic problems, serve at least two major functions in cultural analysis. First, as 
                                                 
84 E.g., PAUL BOHANNAN, JUSTICE AND JUDGEMENT AMONG THE TIV (1989); GUDEMAN, supra note 26; 
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 167-234 (1983); BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN 
SAVAGE SOCIETY (2014); LEOPOLD POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS AND THEIR LAW (1959); ISSAC SHAPERA, A 
HANDBOOK OF TSWANA LAW AND CUSTOM (1994); MAX GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE 
BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA (ZAMBIA) (2d ed. 1967).  
85 Greif, supra note 1, at 915-16, 922-25.  [I don’t think this source is correct.  Can someone check to see 
that it’s saying this?- EB] 
86 Williamson, supra note 54, at 596 (discussing levels of institutions).  See also,North, supra note 54, at 111 
(“What is it about informal constraints that gives them such a pervasive influence upon the long-run character 
of economies?”).  
87 Greif, supra note 1.  
88 Licht et al., supra note 58.  
89 E.g., Arshad Zaman, Review Article, ISLAMIC STUD., Summer 2010 at 277 (reviewing TIMUR KHAN, THE 
LONG DIVERGENCE: HOW ISLAMIC LAW HELD BACK THE MIDDLE EAST (2011)). 
90 KURAN, supra note 81, at 25. 
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discussed above, what differentiates cultural analysis from behavioral economics is 
primarily the examination of behavioral tendencies that are not innate, but rather the 
product of post-birth socialization, education, and indoctrination. In other words, 
cultural analysis’ primary methodological attraction is probably its ability to explain 
societal differences. Second, comparative methods also help demonstrate the logical 
necessity of cultural analysis: many factors can exert influence over any given social 
phenomenon, but only those that help explain comparative differences have a strong 
claim on necessity.  
 As noted above, the “progressive property” school also has much to gain from 
comparative studies of cultural influence. It has thus far attempted to illustrate its 
theoretical claim that property institutions can embody more than one kind of social 
value through case studies drawn from American property law.91 An equally 
compelling, indeed quite possibly more effective, strategy would be to identify 
cultural norms that led different societies to calibrate functionally comparable parts of 
their property laws in qualitatively different ways. If the goal is to demonstrate the 
existence of value pluralism in property use, then finding value pluralism across 
different societies works just as well as finding it in one society. 
 All in all, contemporary property theory has largely neglected or declined to 
seriously examine the potential influence of culture on property institutions. There 
does not, however, seem to be any persuasive reason why it should continue to do so. 
The remaining parts of this Article seek to provide positive reasons for why cultural 
analysis is necessary for a reasonably complete understanding of how property 
institutions are created. 
II. “Reculturalizing” Property Theory 
 
 This Part constructs a cultural theory of how property institutions are created. 
It argues that the following chain of causation is possible and may be especially 
effective at explaining certain inter-society patterns of divergence in property 
institutions. The cultural internalization of certain values and mores leads to adoption 
of correlated status criteria, those criteria then influence the power balance between 
certain interest groups, who negotiate and ultimately produce various property norms 
based on their respective—potentially utilitarian and self-interested—positions and 
bargaining power. There can, therefore, be some significant correlation between a 
society’s internalized cultural values and its property institutions. 
 This does not purport to be a complete theory of property, or even the only 
possible “cultural” theory of property. The goal here is simply to demonstrate that 
there are theoretically coherent ways of incorporating cultural factors into property 
theory, even if we assume, following conventional law and economics, that most 
individuals approach property use and regulation through a self-interested and 
utilitarian mindset. As later parts of the Article will demonstrate, moreover, the 
theory provided here is compatible, perhaps uniquely compatible, with some major 
                                                 
91 There are exceptions. See sources cited supra note 4.  
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sociolegal phenomena in early modern history and helps explain some important 
institutional differences between major Asiatic and European societies. The 
theoretical incorporation of cultural internalization is therefore necessary if we are to 
understand several crucial chapters in the global history of property. 
The theory begins with the basic empirical observation that the creation of 
property rules often produces clear winners and losers. This coexists a bit uneasily 
with the tremendous amount of attention that economists have traditionally devoted 
to finding Pareto-efficient solutions to institutional problems.92 Even the most 
optimistic of scholars would acknowledge, however, that Pareto-efficiency is 
extremely elusive in practice,93 and therefore compensate by applying what is 
commonly referred to as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, in which an outcome is efficient if 
“a Pareto optimal outcome can be reached by arranging sufficient compensation from 
those that are made better off to those that are made worse off so that all would end 
up no worse off than before.”94  
Even so, for the more empirically-minded, it is probably simpler, and 
ultimately much more realistic, to accept that property institutions are sometimes—
                                                 
92 See, e.g., GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 11-12 (1989) (suggesting that changes to 
property law should be such that “[t]he bargaining parties must see their welfare improved or at least made no 
worse off”); Louis de Alessi, Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay in Economic 
Theory, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 64, 68 (1983) (noting that neoclassical models of property rights evolution yield 
outcomes that are Pareto efficient); Eirik G. Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic 
Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature, 10 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1137 (1972) (discussing how the academic 
literature on property rights addresses the issue of Pareto efficiency).  
93 Ellickson, supra note 1, at 28-29; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 
903, 955-56 (1996).  
94 Allison Chaney, Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency, PRINCETON U., 
https://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Kaldor-Hicks_efficiency.html. (last visited Feb. 17, 
2015). But this begs the question of why the losers would agree to the outcome if compensation does not 
actually take place. Some have proposed that it is rational for individuals to pursue Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
at the group level because, over the long run, they will be better off even if they occasionally lose. E.g., 
Ellickson, supra note 1; Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the 
Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L. J. 377 (1998); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of 
the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1. There are two possible scenarios for 
this. First, if “wins” and “losses” are distributed somewhat equally across all group members, each individual 
group member will, in all likelihood, eventually win more than they lose. Second, even if we assume that 
some individuals always win and some always lose, long-term wealth accumulation over a series of Kaldor-
Hicks group decisions by regular winners could nonetheless have a trickle-down effect on the welfare of 
regular losers. Both scenarios have significant weaknesses. The first simply seems incompatible with the 
enormous amount of scholarship on various forms of social oppression and structural inequality. This 
literature is obviously much too vast to cite here. A celebrated recent reiteration of the argument that 
inequality is innately built into certain socioeconomic forms, particularly capitalism, is, of course, THOMAS 
PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014). This echoes the arguments made by 1 KARL MARX, 
CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Ben Fowkes trans., 2004). For others, inequality is not so 
much an innate feature of capitalism as it is the result of elites twisting social, cultural, and political 
institutions to sustain their dominance. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE FIELD OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION: ESSAYS 
ON ART AND LITERATURE (1993). It seems quite obvious that, in many communities, there are those who lose 
far more frequently than they win, and vice versa. The second scenario, on the other hand, will only generate 
individual-level “loser support” for a Kaldor-Hicks efficient outcome if the losers are somehow capable of 
predicting the long-term trickle-down effect. But that would necessarily assume that they possess absurdly 
high information collection and processing abilities, especially when economists cannot even agree on 
whether trickle-down effects really exist. See, e.g., John Kenneth Galbraith, Recession Economics, N.Y. 
REVIEW OF BOOKS, Feb. 4 1982, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1982/feb/04/recession-
economics/; Heather Stewart, Wealth Doesn't Trickle Down—It Just Floods Offshore, Research Reveals, THE 
GUARDIAN (July 21, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jul/21/offshore-wealth-global-
economy-tax-havens.  
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indeed very often—not the outcome of consensual pursuit of “efficient” outcomes, 
but rather the result of winners imposing their will and preferences on the losers. The 
losers do not acquiesce because of murky long-term benefits, but because the short-
term cost of clashing with the winners is too high. This is not to deny that Pareto-
efficient outcomes are possible, or that it may sometimes be rational for losers to 
accept Kaldor-Hicks efficient outcomes, but rather to suggest that there are different 
processes of institutional creation at work.  
The belief that legal or quasi-legal institutions in general, and property 
institutions in particular, are often created via a political process in which the interests 
of certain social groups “win” over the interests of others is, of course, commonplace 
in many branches of social science.95 The field of property theory, however, has been 
somewhat slow to expressly embrace this belief. As Katrina Wyman has observed, 
until quite recently, most major theories on the origin and evolution of property rights 
tended to neglect the role of the “political process,” instead assuming that property 
rights were largely the product of voluntary, even unanimous, social decisions.96 If, 
however, we accept that there are winners and losers in process of creating property 
institutions, the question then becomes: who tend to be the winners, and who tend to 
be the losers?  
There are many possible answers, including how important an issue is to a 
particular individual, relative physical proximity to the affected properties, varying 
information costs imposed on interested parties, or even different levels of mental and 
physical ability. This Article argues, however, that one of the most crucial factors 
over the long run is the relative social and political status of interested parties. 
Conventionally, social status is the rank of either an individual or a group in a social 
hierarchy of honor, prestige, or perceived merit,97 and can depend on a variety of 
factors, such as physical prowess, academic achievement, popularity, wealth, 
religious piety, age, or lineage.98 The reputational and material costs of contradicting 
a higher social status person tend to outweigh those of contradicting a lower status 
one. Correspondingly, higher social status individuals also tend to possess greater 
political power and status.99  
                                                 
95 This literature is, of course, vast. For a basic literature review of public choice theory, see James M. 
Buchanan, Public Choice: The Origins and Development of a Research Program, CTR (2003), 
http://www.gmu.edu/centers/publicchoice/pdf%20links/Booklet.pdf.  
96 See Wyman, supra note 6. 
97 See, e.g., Yoram Weiss & Chaim Fershtman, Social Status and Economic Performance: A Survey, 43 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 801, 802 (1998); Social Status, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/551450/social-status (last visited Dec. 1, 2014) (“Social status 
[is] . . . the relative rank that an individual holds . . . in a social hierarchy based upon honour or prestige.”).  
98 See Xiaotian Zhang, Status Inconsistency Revisited: An Improved Empirical Model, 24 EUR. SOC. REV. 155, 
156 (2008) (noting the complex factors that affect the calculation of social status). 
99 Of course, one could ask why we should not simply discard the status moniker and simply focus on power. 
The answer is that “power” is too broad a term to be applied with much analytical precision, whereas status 
corresponds to a specific kind of power—subjective, perceived, and often intertwined with concepts of 
legitimacy—that is of particular relevance to how power is obtained in modern societies. A man who holds a 
gun to my head has power over me, as does someone who has lent me money, but they do not hold higher 
status than I do. 
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This is, of course, necessarily a long-term approximation: in any given case, a 
lower status individual may very well be able to advance her institutional preferences 
over those of a higher status individual because she cares more about the issues at 
hand and is willing to devote more social capital to them, or because she has better 
access to information. Over the long run, however, these relatively contingent and 
individualized advantages will probably even out at the group level. When this 
happens, relative social status will be a fairly accurate predictor of how often, and to 
what extent, different individuals can obtain desirable institutional outcomes.100  
Alternatively, from the perspective of comparative scholarship, if large, 
similarly constituted societies in comparable economic circumstances—that is, if 
comparable segments of their respective populations share similar preferences of 
similar intensity on comparable economic issues—consistently end up with different 
property norms, then we should take seriously the likelihood that different 
distributions of social status within each society are driving the institutional 
divergence. First, the size of the societies will smooth out differences in individual 
intelligence or physical ability. Second, the consistency of the divergence over time 
smooths out short-term changes in institutional preferences or information access. 
Finally, similarity between economic conditions suggests that purely materialistic 
explanations are unlikely to succeed.  
If all these conditions are met, then a status-based public choice theory seems 
highly attractive: if the individuals who support establishing property norm A in 
Society 1 collectively have higher relative status—compared to opponents of norm 
A—than the individuals who support norm A or its equivalent in Society 2, then we 
would naturally expect that norm A has a higher chance to emerge in Society 1 than 
in Society 2. Essentially, status distributions determine the relative bargaining power 
of different interest groups, leading to different institutional outcomes. 
It is rarely acceptable, however, to simply take status distributions as 
exogenous: a satisfactory theory must also explain how the specific distributions of 
status it utilizes to explain property institutions were created in the first place. One 
way to begin this inquiry is to ask why the formal criteria by which status is allocated 
often differ dramatically from society to society: there are aristocracies, where status 
depends on lineage, gerontocracies, where it depends on seniority, and formal 
plutocracies, where wealth is explicitly the primary determinant.101 Socialist societies 
often claim, at least, to value fundamentally different personal traits than capitalist 
                                                 
100 This leads, of course, to structural inequality where certain social classes and groups are able to sustain 
their dominance over long periods of time. See discussion at supra note 94. 
101 Aristocracies were arguably the dominant European form of political organization for most the past two 
millennia, beginning with the Roman Empire. See, e.g., ROBERT BARTLETT, THE MAKING OF EUROPE: 
CONQUEST, COLONIZATION, AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 950-1350, at 24-59 (1993); JONATHAN DEWALD, THE 
EUROPEAN NOBILITY, 1400-1800 (1996); JOHN MATTHEWS, WESTERN ARISTOCRACIES AND IMPERIAL COURT, 
AD 364-425 (1990); SUSAN REYNOLDS, FIEFS AND VASSALS: THE MEDIEVAL EVIDENCE REINTERPRETED (1994). 
Later parts of this Article argue that Qing and Republican local society was, to a significant extent, a 
gerontocracy, whereas early modern English society was, to a large extent, a plutocracy dominated by the 
landed classes. Many would argue, of course, that modern capitalism has a worrying tendency to become 
plutocratic. For a very recent version of this argument, see JOHN SKINNER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, SOCIAL 
PLUTOCRACY: AN AMERICAN CRISIS (2014).  
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ones.102 Much of this may be rhetorical, but if we look past the rhetoric, and instead 
at the actual correlations between sociopolitical stature and factors such as wealth or 
age—as the remainder of this Article attempts to do—there is still considerable 
reason to believe that different societies can indeed allocate status based on 
qualitatively different criteria.103  
Assuming, then, that there is at least a serious theoretical possibility that 
different communities and societies sometimes choose fundamentally different status 
allocation criteria, why do they do that? There are both materialist and non-
materialist ways to answer this. The materialist answer would point to the possibility 
that the different status allocation criteria were simply pragmatic reactions to 
different economic, ecological, or geopolitical circumstances. It makes sense to tie 
status to military achievement, for example, in a resource-poor country that relies on 
external conquest or colonization for economic sustenance.104 Alternatively, rich city-
states that rely heavily on commerce and trade might give higher status to the 
wealthy.105 In other words, the old Marxist axiom of “economic base determines 
superstructure” applies.  
The alternative would be to emphasize the cultural agency that both human 
societies and individual human beings possess—to argue that they do not merely 
react passively to material circumstances, but in some cases act according to 
internalized social values.106 In this scenario, status hierarchies and the criteria upon 
which they are based may not be what is materially necessary or optimal, or the 
equilibrium outcome of self-interested negotiation, but rather what members of the 
society have “internalized” as right, moral, or just. Cultural internalization can kick in 
at any point in a society’s history: one can easily imagine a set of status criteria 
emerging initially through utilitarian bargaining, but later becoming internalized as a 
core moral principle. That is, later generations may take for granted what earlier 
generations fought over. This would still be a qualitatively different process than path 
dependence, which occurs when later generations decide that the costs of revising the 
criteria outweigh the potential benefits of revision.107 In contrast, cultural 
                                                 
102 For a recent discussion on the evolution of popular political culture—including perceptions of individual 
self-worth and social prestige—in pre-1978 China, see WU YI-CHING, THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AT THE 
MARGINS: CHINESE SOCIALISM IN CRISIS (2014). On political culture in socialist societies, see generally 
Kenneth Jowitt, An Organizational Approach to Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems, 68 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 1171 (1974).  
103 See discussion infra pp. 52-64.  
104 On the martial culture of the Mongols, see THOMAS T. ALLSEN, CULTURE AND CONQUEST IN MONGOL 
EURASIA (2001). On the political culture of Vikings, see ANGELO FORTE ET AL., VIKING EMPIRES 170-216 
(2005).  
105 On the political culture of Italian city-states, see DANIEL WALEY & TREVOR DEAN, THE ITALIAN CITY-
REPUBLICS 128-69 (4th ed. 2013).  
106 See Greif, supra note 1; Ellickson, supra note 1; Etzioni, supra note 2; Cooter, supra note 2, at 1. For 
more general discussions on the topic, see CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY: 
DECISION-MAKING THROUGH MUTUAL ADJUSTMENTS (1965); HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: 
A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION (4th ed. 1976); Amartya Sen, 
Rational fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 
(1977).  
107 See, e.g., Paul A. David, Why Are Institutions the “Carriers of History”?: Path Dependence and the 
Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions, 5 STRUCTURAL CHANGE & ECON. DYNAMICS 205 
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internalization would, at some level, void the cost-benefit analysis in favor of moral 
commitment. 
A law and economics scholar who is committed to methodological 
individualism may well harbor doubts about both the plausibility and desirability of 
cultural internalization.108 The plausibility question would likely come in the 
following form: why would an individual internalize a set of status criteria that has 
the potential to damage his or her material interests? As noted above, there is 
considerable empirical evidence to suggest that individual economic behavior in early 
modern and modern societies was strongly utilitarian and self-interested, and there is 
certainly no reason to believe that contemporary societies are any less utilitarian. Can 
the cultural internalization of status criteria be consistent with a basic assumption of 
individual economic utilitarianism? 
The simplest answer to these concerns would be to point out that individual 
utilitarianism in things like land use and wealth management does not imply that 
human beings are similarly utilitarian in other parts of their behavior. There is, 
fortunately, a less cynical way to put this: it seems very possible that status 
hierarchies and criteria are usually introduced to individuals at a far earlier stage of 
life than economic decision making regarding land or other major sources of 
livelihood. Correspondingly, there is some reason to suspect that the former is more 
susceptible to value internalization than the latter. 
Status criteria are probably among the earliest norms a child is exposed to as 
he or she develops cognitive reasoning abilities. Parents are usually the first and 
primary source of authority and hierarchy, with other adult relatives, babysitters or 
nannies, teachers, and other children following closely behind. Young children 
rapidly acquire a fairly accurate and nuanced sense of which people to respect and 
obey, and also of which personal traits to value and prioritize.109 In particular, 
children born in highly religious or morally consolidated societies will likely be 
introduced to basic religious or moral tenets, including those regarding status 
hierarchies, well before they reach adolescence.110  
                                                                                                                                     
(1994); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependency, Lock-in, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
205 (1995); James Mahoney, Path Dependency in Historical Sociology, 29 THEORY & SOC’Y 507 (2000); 
Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependency, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251 
(2000). 
108 See sources cited supra note 27. 
109 E.g., CAROLYN U. SHANTZ, DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL COGNITION (1975); John D. Coie et al., Dimensions 
and Types of Social Status: A Cross-Age Perspective, 18 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 557 (1982); Patricia 
H. Hawley, The Ontogenesis of Social Dominance: A Strategy-Based Evolutionary Perspective, 19 
DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 97 (1999). There have also been studies that consider whether humans have an innate 
need for status hierarchies. E.g., HAROLD J. LEAVITT, TOP DOWN: WHY HIERARCHIES ARE HERE TO STAY AND 
HOW TO MANAGE THEM MORE EFFECTIVELY (2004); ARNOLD S. TANNENBAUM ET AL., HIERARCHY IN 
ORGANIZATIONS (1974); Joe C. Magee & Adam D. Galinsky, Social Hierarchy: The Self-Reinforcing Nature 
of Power and Status, 2 ACAD. OF MGMT. ANNALS 351 (2008); Jessica L. Tracy & David Matsumoto, The 
Spontaneous Expression of Pride and Shame: Evidence for Biologically Innate Nonverbal Displays, 105 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 11655 (2008). 
110 E.g., Everett L. Worthington Jr., Religious Faith across the Life Span, 17 COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 555,   
(1989); David Elkind, The Child's Conception of His Religious Denomination II: The Catholic Child, 101 J. 
GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY 185 (1962).  
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In comparison, while almost all children experience basic urges to acquire 
food, or to hoard toys, few are exposed, even in early modern agrarian societies, to 
serious wealth management problems or to property norms and laws until a much 
more advanced age—that is, these are usually “adult problems.”111 It may simply be 
that serious economic planning or substantive thinking about property norms requires 
fairly mature reasoning abilities, and is therefore something that most individuals do 
not grapple with until a relatively advanced age, whereas basic status criteria require 
only elementary cognitive abilities to understand and digest. Justifying status criteria 
is, of course, vastly more complicated, but the point of value internalization is 
precisely to render conscious justification unnecessary. 
There is a considerable body of psychological research, going back to Freud, 
Piaget, and Kohlberg, which argues that children acquire their internalized normative 
preferences at a young age and that younger children tend to be more normatively 
malleable than older ones.112 Such assertions remain commonplace.113 This suggests 
that there is some basis for suspecting that status criteria, by virtue of their extremely 
early introduction in the average person’s life, may be more “internalizable” than 
property norm preferences, which are generally not developed until many years later. 
In fact, status criteria are encountered and accepted so early in most people’s lives 
that, if we allow for any possibility of non-self-interested norm internalization at all, 
they would probably be one of the most likely candidates. 
So much for plausibility, but what about desirability? Why should we 
seriously investigate a cultural internalization theory of status hierarchies when, as 
noted above, there are plenty of materialistic alternatives available? The basic answer 
is that, while it may not be a bad idea to consider the materialistic alternatives first, 
there are also some fairly commonplace scenarios, especially historically, where the 
materialistic theories run into serious difficulties, but where a cultural internalization 
account would work very well. The basis for this argument is the apparent truism that 
societal-level phenomena deserve societal-level explanations: applied to the 
proliferation of status criteria, it would mean that a widely embraced set of criteria 
                                                 
111 There is some consensus that this is true in contemporary populations.. Annamaria Lusardi et al., 
Financial Literacy Among the Young: Evidence and Implications for Consumer Policy (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 15352, 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15352; Haiyang Chen & Ronald P. 
Volpe, An Analysis of Personal Financial Literacy Among College Students, 7 FIN. SERV. REV. 107 (1998). 
There is also quite a bit of evidence on this for pre-modern and early modern Europe. See ALAN 
MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM: THE FAMILY PROPERTY AND SOCIAL TRANSITION 
(1978); JAN DE VRIES, THE INDUSTRIOUS REVOLUTION: CONSUMER DEMAND AND THE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY, 
1650 TO THE PRESENT (2008).  
112 JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 13-108 (Marjorie Cabain trans., 1965); see also 
LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 
409-12 (1981); RICHARD WOLLHEIM, FREUD 177-218 (1971); PARENTING AND CHILDREN’S INTERNALIZATION 
OF VALUES: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY THEORY (Joan E. Grusec & Leon Kuczynski ed., 1997); Joan E. 
Grusec & Jacqueline J. Goodnow, Impact of Parental Discipline Methods on the Child’s Internalization of 
Values: A Reconceptualization of Current Points of View, 30 DEVELOPMENT PSYCH. 4 (1994); K.V. Roe, 
Early Empathy Development in Children and the Subsequent Internalization of Moral Values, 110 J. SOC. 
PSYCH. 147 (1980).  
113 Amir N. Licht, Social Norms and the Law: Why Peoples Obey the Law, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 715 (2008) 
(citing HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 193-278 (1989)). But see Etzioni, supra note 2.  
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deserves an origins story that explains not merely why it makes sense in any specific 
locality but why it became popular across so many different communities.  
In some cases, it could simply be that different parts of society share enough 
core material traits—economic production, ecology, geopolitical challenges, and so 
on—that a purely organic, bottom-up, and materialistic norm creation process would 
still have generated similar status criteria. In other cases, however, a society can 
possess so much material diversity that it becomes extremely difficult to imagine how 
status criteria-homogeneity came to exist without the interference of exogenous, 
societal-wide factors. 
Take, for example, the case of Qing China: within its economic core, some 
macro-regions produced wheat, others rice, still others a mixture of the two.114 In 
some regions, the primary commercial good, apart from grain, was silk, in others, salt, 
tea, or tobacco. Water-based transportation and trade was readily available in some 
regions, extremely expensive in others. Correspondingly, the level of urbanization 
and proto-industrialization varied wildly from region to region.115 Despite all this, as 
will be argued below, most local communities within its core macroregions seemed to 
coalesce around a common set of status criteria. It simply seems unlikely that a 
bottom-up ecological or economic need-based theory of norm creation can explain 
the coexistence of normative uniformity with such vast ecological and economic 
variance. To do that, we would have to identify some hidden but crucial material 
characteristic shared by the core Chinese macroregions that drove their local 
communities towards a single mode of social ordering. The precise nature and 
socioeconomic consequences of Chinese social hierarchies, as discussed below, make 
this appear a virtually impossible task. 
The challenge then becomes to identify an exogenous cross-regional “force” 
that can account for the normative uniformity. For modern societies, the obvious 
solution would probably be to consider political economy-based theories of 
centralized state action. Modern state and legal apparatuses are, especially in 
developed countries, centralized, complex, and powerful enough to offer an 
extremely large range of such possibilities: legislation, administrative rulemaking, 
public education, or even the establishment of a state religion could all provide ample 
material or political incentives, both positive and negative, to adopt a certain set of 
status criteria.116  
                                                 
114 THE CITY IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 211 (G. William Skinner ed., 1977); Jonathan D. Spence, The Search 
for Modern China 75-78 (1999). 
115 Compare the description of the Lower Yangtze economy in BOZHONG LI, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
IN JIANGNAN, 1620-1850, at 107-08 (1998), with the description of the North China economy in PHILIP C.C. 
HUANG, THE PEASANT ECONOMY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NORTH CHINA 118-20 (1985).  
116 On the ability of laws to shape social norms, see, for example, TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC 
LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1998); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); Kenworthey Bilz 
& Janice Nadler, Law, Psychology and Morality, in 50 MORAL COGNITION AND DECISION MAKING: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 101 (D. Medin et al. eds., 2009); Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges 
vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, Social 
Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997); and Lawrence Lessig, The 
Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995). 
Cultural Paradigms in Property Institutions 5/27/2016 7:32 PM 
 
 
 
28 
 
If, however, we turn our attention once again to pre-modern or early modern 
societies, then it becomes much harder to argue that centralized state activity was 
driving social norm creation through coercion or incentivizing. Simply put, states 
were usually not that powerful back then, especially—and ironically, considering the 
longevity of the “oriental despotism” thesis—in non-Western societies.117 Returning 
to the Chinese example, historians generally agree that late imperial governments 
rarely interfered with local socioeconomic life and, indeed, did not have the financial 
resources to do so even when they desired a more active role.118 There is very little 
reason to believe that local communities felt at all compelled or substantially 
incentivized to seek state approval for their preferred status criteria. Quite the 
opposite, local communities very often violated express legal prohibitions to establish 
the kind of kinship networks and hierarchies that they preferred.119 
This implies, then, that local communities had to have voluntarily accepted 
and sustained these status hierarchies, but often not for economic or ecological 
reasons. What potential explanations, then, do we have left? We could try, 
presumably, to construct a coordination game where the chosen set of status criteria 
acquired focal point status out of a set of multiple available criteria, none that were 
more materially attractive at the group level than others,120 but this, too, runs into 
serious difficulties, especially in the China case: if economic and ecological variation 
is inconsistent with one set of criteria being materially optimal in most local 
communities, then it is probably equally inconsistent with the “multiple equilibria 
pools” in these communities all sharing one particular equilibrium. In fact, the set of 
status criteria that ultimately “emerged victorious” in late imperial China arguably 
did a very poor job, when compared to available alternatives, of boosting economic 
efficiency and protecting social stability.121 Focal point theories cannot explain this. 
At this point, it is far simpler to look into cultural explanations—to examine 
whether there is a coherent account of value and norm internalization that could 
explain the popularity of these status criteria. There are at least two major 
possibilities. First, people internalized the criteria themselves, or at least certain 
mores or values that supported them. Second, people internalized a desire—not 
connected to any direct material incentive—to imitate the sociopolitical elite, who 
possessed certain quantities of innate “moral prestige.”122 This would presumably 
                                                 
117 See discussion infra p.34. On legal orientalism, see William P. Alford, Law, Law, What Law?: Why 
Western Scholars of Chinese History and Society Have Not Had More to Say about Its Law, 23 MODERN 
CHINA 398 (1997); Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2002).  
118 See discussion infra note 156. 
119 See discussion infra Parts III.A.1 and IV.B.2. 
120 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54-67 (1960); Maarten C.W. Janssen, Focal 
Points, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 150 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); 
Richard McAdams, Beyond the Prisoner's Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 SOUTHERN 
CAL. L. REV. 173 (2009); Richard McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 339 
(2000); Maarten C.W. Jaanssen, Rationalizing Focal Points, 50 THEORY & DECISION 119 (2001); Robert 
Sugden, A Theory of Focal Points, 105 Econ. J. 533 (1995). 
121 See discussion infra pp. 55-56.  
122 On the imitation of elite culture and rights by the general population, see, for example, James Q. Whitman, 
The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1165-89 (2004) 
(describing how European elite concepts of privacy and dignity came to be embraced by the general 
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drive them to adhere to whatever status criteria they believed the elite abided by. In 
the historical evidence surveyed below, the former possibility is much more 
pronounced than the latter, but the latter certainly could have played a significant role, 
both here and in other social scenarios.  
 Some might argue that going straight to cultural internalization overlooks the 
possibility that social groups or individuals might adopt certain status criteria because 
they believe it will boost their social status or reputation among peers—assuming, as 
discussed above, that the criteria do not make economic or ecological sense.123 This is 
plausible, but it leads to a chick-and-egg conundrum: why would these groups or 
individuals believe that these criteria will boost their reputation unless they also 
believed that their peers had already internalized them? That is, such a mindset might 
explain why newcomers to a region with pre-established norms chose to abide by 
those norms,124 but it cannot explain how the norms initially emerged.  
 A few additional notes on how this study differs from previous attempts to 
compare property systems: Greif’s theory of cultural influence is thematically quite 
similar to what is being attempted here but, as discussed above, makes no real 
attempt to demonstrate that the “cultural factors” it relies upon are actually 
“cultural.”125 The account below attempts both to present a thicker account of social 
culture and to demonstrate that its emergence, predominance, and longevity demand 
an internalization-based explanation. 
 Smith and Yun-chien Chang have recently produced an important 
comparative study of property frameworks in common law and civil law systems. 
They find that these legal systems differ more in form than in substance, and all 
display a strong commitment to “the right to exclude, in rem status and running with 
assets.”126 The account presented below is, in fact, compatible with this: it is perfectly 
possible that the basic principles of private property use are similar in most 
commercial economies due to the information cost issues that Smith and Chang 
identify. Nonetheless, substantive differences on narrower issues of use and 
alienability—the specific terms of tenancy termination, the length of mortgage 
redemption windows, the division of inheritable assets, and so on—may well exist 
within this common framework and, despite their more limited scope, be of enormous 
socioeconomic consequence.  
III. From Status Distributions to Property Institutions 
 
 Parts III and IV apply the theoretical framework outlined in Part II to the pre-
industrial legal history of China, England, and Japan. The chain of causation in this 
                                                                                                                                     
population).  
123 See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 
(1997) (providing a theory of social norms based on reputation sanctions) ; and ERIC POSNER, LAW AND 
SOCIAL NORMS (2000) on reputational sanctions and the value of signaling.  
124 See Jonathan Bendor & Piotr Swistak, The Evolution of Norms, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1493, 1496 (2001). 
125 See discussion surrounding supra notes 87-Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
126 Chang & Smith, supra note 43. 
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framework runs, as discussed above, from cultural norms of status allocation to 
distributions of sociopolitical power, to property institutions. This Part illustrates the 
latter part of this chain: it argues that major differences in mortgage institutions 
between pre-industrial China, England, and Japan had roots in their different 
distributions of sociopolitical status. Lower-income households consistently occupied 
a large share of political leadership positions in the early modern Chinese countryside, 
but were largely excluded from such positions in Tokugawa Japan, and almost 
completely excluded in early modern England. Correspondingly, they were able to 
secure very favorable mortgage redemption norms in China, but accepted much 
harsher norms in Japan and succumbed to extremely harsh ones in England. 
 At around two centuries prior to large-scale industrialization, correlating to 
the mid-eighteenth century in China, mid-xixteenth in England, and early eighteenth 
in Japan, the three rural economies had a great deal in common. Recent historical 
scholarship strongly suggests that all three economies were significantly 
commercialized, with large segments of their rural populations—in core 
macroregions, at least—producing food and textile materials for market 
consumption.127 The corresponding drive to specialize production led to improving 
living standards for most rural households, although natural disasters and famine 
remained a real threat. All three economies were fairly self-contained: foreign trade, 
while certainly a growing presence, only accounted for a fraction of total economic 
output.128 They were also predominantly rural, with well over eighty percent of the 
population engaged in agricultural production.129 
                                                 
127 On Chinese market integration, see, for example, Yeh-Chien Wang, One Secular Trends of Rice Prices in 
the Yangzi Delta, 1638-1935, in CHINESE HISTORY IN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 81, at 35, 35-99; 
HUANG supra note 115; BOZHONG LI, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN JIANGNAN, 1620-1850, at 107-08 
(1998); LILLIAN M. LI, FIGHTING FAMINE IN NORTH CHINA: STATE, MARKET, AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECLINE 
1690S-1990S, at 113, 164-65, 196-220 (2007). For comparisons with England, see POMERANZ, supra note 81; 
ROBERT ALLEN, THE BRITISH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2009). On Japanese market 
integration, see Jean-Pascal Bassino, Market Integration and Famines in Early Modern Japan, 1717-1857 
(Nov. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://federation.ens.fr/ydepot/semin/texte0708/BAS2007MAR.pdf.  
128 On the modest size of early modern English trade, see RALPH DAVIS, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND 
BRITISH OVERSEAS TRADE 62-63 (1979); and Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James Robinson, The Rise 
of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 546 (2005). On 
Chinese foreign trade, see Wolfgang Keller, Ben Li & Carol H. Shive, China’s Foreign Trade: Perspectives 
from the Past 150 Years, 34 WORLD ECON. 853 (2011). On Japan, see Daniel M. Bernhofen & John C. Brown, 
An Empirical Assessment of the Comparative Advantage Gains from Trade: Evidence from Japan, 95 AM. 
ECON. REV. 208 (2005).  
129 On England, see Robert C. Allen, Economic Structure and Agricultural Productivity in Europe, 1300-
1800, 4 EUR. R. ECON. HIST. 1, 11 (2000); S. Todd Lowry, The Agricultural Foundation of the Seventeenth-
Century English Oeconomy, 35 HIST. POL. ECON. 74, 75 (2003); and Theofanis C. Tsoulouhas, A New Look 
at Demographic and Technological Changes: England, 1550 to 1839, 29 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 169, 
176–77 (1992) (using data from EDWARD A.EDWARD A. WRIGLEY & ROGER S. SCHOFIELD, THE POPULIST 
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1541-1871 A RECONSTRUCTION (1981)). On China and Japan, see James I. Nakamura 
& Matao Miyamoto, Social Structure and Population Change: A Comparative Study of Tokugawa Japan and 
Ch'ing China, 30 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 229 (1982); and Yu Tongyuan (余同元), Ming Qing 
Zaoqi Gongyehua Shehuide Xingcheng yu Fazhan (明清江南早期工业化社会的形成与发展) [The 
Formation and Development of Early Industralized Society in Jiangnan in Ming-Qing Period], 11 J. HIST. SCI. 
(2007).  
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 Beyond these broad macroeconomic similarities, the three societies also 
shared some finer characteristics. First, their rural economies were dominated by 
smallholder households at this point in time. In two of China’s most developed 
macroregions, the Lower Yangtze and North China, the top ten percent of landowners 
probably owned, respectively, around forty and twenty percent of arable land, and 
only managed ten to fifteen percent themselves, which meant that some eighty to 
ninety percent of arable land was being tilled by household-sized production units.130 
A similar situation existed in England during the early seventeenth century,131 and in 
Japan during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.132 
 Second, the ownership—and, in cases of tenancy, usage—rights of these 
smallholder households were generally secure. Most smallholders owned much of the 
land they farmed in China, and enjoyed what modern lawyers would recognize as 
secure private control: the ability, guaranteed by both formal and customary law, to 
exclude others, the sole authority to enjoy after-tax produce, and close-to-full control 
over land usage.133 Those who leased land from larger landlords often enjoyed highly 
secure tenancy rights under a system called “one land two owners” (yitian liangzhu), 
which prevented them from being evicted except under some fairly extreme 
circumstances.134 In early sixteenth century England, most smallholders held 
copyhold tenure over their land, which enjoyed a level of legal protection in both 
common law and manorial courts comparable to freehold land.135 In Japan, too, 
secure private ownership—technically of usage rights, given the country’s feudal 
superstructure—gradually became the dominant kind of property right during the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, triggering a large rise in permanent investments in 
land and irrigation during the following three centuries.136 
                                                 
130 Taisu Zhang, Property Rights in Land, Agricultural Capitalism, and the Relative Decline of Pre-Industrial 
China, 13 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 129 (2011).  
131 Leigh Shaw-Taylor, The Rise of Agrarian Capitalism and the Decline of Family Farming in England, 65 
ECON. HIST. REV. 26, 31-36 (2011); ROBERT C. ALLEN, ENCLOSURE AND THE YEOMAN: THE AGRICULTURAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH MIDLANDS 1450–1850, at 73, tbl.4-4, 78-104 (1992); Stephen Hipkin, The 
Structure of Land Ownership and Land Occupation in the Romney Marsh Region, 1646–1834, 51 AGRIC. 
HIST. REV. 69, 69 (2003).  
132 SMITH, supra note 17; THOMAS C. SMITH, NATIVE SOURCES OF JAPANESE INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1750-1920 
(1988).  
133 See Madeleine Zelin, A Critique of Rights of Property in Prewar China, in CONTRACT AND PROPERTY IN 
EARLY MODERN CHINA 17-8 (Madeleine Zelin, Jonathan K. Ocko & Robert Gardella eds., 2004). Private 
property became a predominant feature of the Chinese economy as early as the 12th and 13th Centuries.  See 
Joseph P. McDermott, Charting Blank Spaces and Disputed Regions: The Problem of Sung Land Tenure, 44 
J. ASIAN STUD. 13, 13 (1984).  
134 E.g., KATHRYN BERNHARDT, RENTS, TAXES, AND PEASANT RESISTANCE: THE LOWER YANGTZE REGION, 
1840-1950, at 25 (1992); PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CODE, CUSTOM, AND LEGAL PRACTICE IN CHINA: THE QING AND 
THE REPUBLIC COMPARED 99-118 (2001).  
135 See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 348–50 (3d ed. 1990); ERIC KERRIDGE, 
AGRARIAN PROBLEMS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER 32-93 (1969); S. F. C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 41-64 (2d ed. 1981).  
136 See RAMSEYER, supra note 19, at 26-27; Osumu Saito, Land, Labour and Market Forces in Tokugawa 
Japan, 24 CONTINUITY & CHANGE 169, 170-71 (2009). But see Philip C. Brown, State, Cultivator, Land: 
Determination of Land Tenures in Early Modern Japan Reconsidered, 56 J. ASIAN STUD. 421 (1997) (arguing 
that some villages redistributed land fairly regularly).  
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 Third, landholders in all three countries also enjoyed considerable freedom to 
alienate their property rights. Land selling, leasing, and mortgaging was routine in the 
Chinese countryside. This applied not only to owners but to tenants as well, who 
often transferred, subleased, and mortgaged their tenancy rights, especially when they 
were of the “one land two owners” variety.137 Early modern English copyholders sold, 
mortgaged, and leased their land through basically the same legal instruments as 
freeholders.138 Japanese landholders, while theoretically banned from selling land by 
Tokugawa law, nonetheless found a number of ways to circumvent these 
restrictions.139 
 Fourth, the primary impetus for landholders, whether Chinese, English, or 
Japanese, to sell or mortgage land was serious financial stress: upcoming weddings, 
funerals, or large debts coming due.140 Median or lower-income rural households, in 
particular, usually could only meet these financial demands through the selling or 
mortgaging of land. Outside of these circumstances—in which a failure to raise cash 
could trigger severe social penalties—they rarely put their land up for sale or 
mortgage, and indeed for very good reason: given the relative paucity of non-
agricultural employment in these pre-industrial economies, the price of land would 
have had to be extraordinarily high for significant numbers of peasants to willingly 
put their property on the market.141 The large number of smallholders who were 
forced to sell or mortgage land due to financial stress, however, kept prices 
substantially lower than that. For similar reasons, larger landholders who had access 
to spare cash were usually eager to acquire additional land.  
These basic incentives created some fairly strong income-based divisions 
between sellers/debtors and buyers/creditors: larger landholders rarely needed to sell 
land to make ends meet, whereas smallholders frequently did. In two North China 
villages, for example, nearly ninety percent of land mortgagors and sellers during the 
later 1930s came from the bottom half of landholders, whereas only three percent 
                                                 
137 Kenneth Pomeranz, Land Markets in Late Imperial and Republican China, 23 CONTINUITY & CHANGE 10, 
131-36 (2008).  
138 See sources cited supra note 135. 
139 See RAMSEYER, supra note 19 at 26. 
140 On China and England, see TAISU ZHANG, LAWS AND ECONOMICS OF CONFUCIANISM: KINSHIP, PROPERTY, 
AND AGRICULTURAL CAPITALISM IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL CHINA AND ENGLAND 37 (forthcoming 2016); THE 
BRENNER DEBATE: AGRARIAN CLASS STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL EUROPE 
10-63, 236 (T.H. Aston and C.H.E. Philpin eds., 1987); Phillipp R. Schofield, Dearth, Debt and the Local 
Land Market in a Late Thirteenth-Century Village Community, 45 AGRIC. HIST. REV. 1 (1997); Govind 
Sreenivasan, The Land-Family Bond at Earls Colne (Essex) 1550-1650, 131 PAST & PRESENT 3 (1991) 
(documenting the unwillingness of English peasants to sell land); and Zvi Razi, Family, Land and the Village 
Community in Later Medieval England, 93 PAST & PRESENT 3 (1981). On the economic incentives to sell 
land in Tokugawa Japan, see SMITH, supra note 17, at 8158 (“[Mortgaging documents] show that borrowing 
by peasants usually originated in poverty . . . .”); WILLIAM CHAMBLISS, CHIARAIJIMA VILLAGE: LAND TENURE, 
TAXATION, AND LOCAL TRADE, 1811-1884, at 36-37 (1965) (noting that selling or mortgaging land tended to 
indicate declining economic fortunes); and Tsutomu Ouchi, Chiso kaisei zengo no nominsho no bunkai to 
jinushisei, in 1 CHISO KAISEI NO KENKYU 37 (Uno Kozo ed., 1957). 
141 On China, see HUANG, supra note 134, at 73; and Madeleine Zelin, The Rights of Tenants in Mid-Qing 
Sichuan: A Study of Land-Related Lawsuits in the Baxian Archives, 45 J. ASIAN STUD. 499, 514-517 (1986). 
On Japanese labor markets, see Saito, supra note 136, at 176. 
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belonged to the top twenty-five percent.142 Moreover, nearly all existing contract 
archives from Qing and Republican China suggest that land mortgages and sales 
generally involved a few large landholders accumulating land from dozens of poorer 
neighbors.143 The same was true of both England and Japan, where existing historical 
sources document a steady flow of land from smallholders to wealthier households in 
the early modern era, but very little in the other direction.144 
 Finally, customary law, rather than formal legal regulations, tended to govern 
how landholders (usually smallholders) could sell and mortgage land (usually to a 
wealthier neighbor). As discussed below, central level laws and regulations in China 
and Japan were often ignored, both by local communities and even by local courts. 
The English common law enjoyed a relatively more harmonious coexistence with 
local customs, but even there, manor and borough customs played a larger role in 
regulating land use and transaction than formal legal institutions.145 In general, early 
modern governments were rarely powerful and expansive enough to effectively 
regulate local economic behavior.146 
 These, then, were the broader socioeconomic conditions under which early 
modern Chinese, English, and Japanese rural communities contemplated and created 
mortgage institutions. The scope and depth of these macro-level similarities supplies 
the functional comparability of something as specific as mortgage institutions: in all 
three societies, mortgages, like permanent sales, were primarily a way for 
smallholders to exchange land for cash in times of financial stress. Correspondingly, 
they were also an important way for larger landholders to begin the process of 
accumulating land, which, as discussed below, was generally their main incentive in 
handing out loans.147 For all these commonalities, however, the three countries 
diverged wildly on the specific rules that governed mortgage redemption, indeed with 
enormous economic consequences. 
 Section A below outlines the core characteristics of each society’s mortgage 
regime. It also explains the basic economic incentives and consequences for both 
mortgagor and mortgagee. Section B considers possible explanations for these 
                                                 
142 3 Chugoku Noson Kanko Chosa [Investigation of Rural Chinese Customs] [hereinafter Mantetsu Surveys] 
5 (Comm. for the Publ’n of the Rural Customs and Practices of China ed., 1958); 4 Mantetsu Surveys, at 218 
(showing a similar situation in a different village). 
143 ZHANG, supra note 140, at 79. 
144 On England, see THE BRENNER DEBATE, supra note 140; KERRIDGE, supra note 135, at 36-37; J.V. Beckett, 
The Pattern of Landownership in England and Wales, 1660-1880, 37 ECON. HIST. REV. 1 (1984); and R.W. 
Hoyle, Tenure and the Land Market in Early Modern England: Or a Late Contribution to the Brenner 
Debate, 43 ECON. HIST. REV. 1, 7-12, 17-18 (1990) (placing the start of conscious landlord encroachment at 
around 1550). On Japan, see ANNE BOOTH & R. M. SUNDRUM, LABOUR ABSORPTION IN AGRICULTURE: 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 145 (1985); SMITH, supra note 18; T.J. Byres, The 
Agrarian Question, Forms of Capitalist Agrarian Transition and the State: An Essay with Reference to Asia, 
14 SOC. SCIENTIST 3 (1986); and Saito, supra note 136, at 173-74.  
145 On the general detachment of the common law from regular socioeconomic life, see Richard Ross, 
Commoning of the Common Law: The Renaissance Debate over Printing English Law, 1520-1640, 146 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 323 (1998).  
146 On the limitations of the Chinese state, see discussion surrounding infra note 156. On Japan, see OOMS, 
supra note 17, at 192-242 (discussing village-level autonomy). On the evolution of the English state and how 
it compares with Chinese and Japanese state capacity, see sources cited at supra note 18. 
147 See discussion surrounding infra notes 170-171. 
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institutional differences, arguing that a sociopolitical status-based explanation is 
superior to conceivable alternatives. 
A. Mortgage Redemption in Early Modern Societies 
1. China 
The Qing or Republican landholder who faced some kind of pressing 
financial need—assuming the need was too large to be met through unsecured 
borrowing or the pawning of personal items—had two basic options. First, he could 
permanently sell some of his land. Qing and Republican law recognized and enforced 
land-sale contracts with automatic regularity, as did the customary laws of virtually 
all rural communities. Alternatively, he could put the land up for a dian sale, which 
was basically the Chinese equivalent of a classic common law mortgage. Under this 
arrangement, the landholder conveyed land usage rights to a creditor in exchange for 
sixty to eighty percent of the land’s full value under a permanent sale.148 The creditor 
could use the land freely until the original landholder paid off his debt, upon which 
he regained usage rights. No interest accrued on the debt,149 which meant that the 
creditor’s primary incentive for issuing the loan was temporary use of the land itself. 
To protect this interest, many contracts provided for a guaranteed-usage period of one 
to five years, starting immediately after the signing of the dian contract, within which 
the debtor was not allowed to redeem.150 
Once this period passed, however, customary law in China’s core 
macroregions, especially North China, the Lower Yangtze, and South China, 
generally gave the debtor a valid right of redemption for, essentially, forever.151 As 
one local custom stated, dian sales “could be redeemed after several hundred years, 
and the price of redemption would always remain the same.”152 Under the influence 
of such customs, very few dian contracts from these macroregions attempted to 
establish any redemption deadline, and most dian sales were apparently redeemed at 
some point, often many decades afterwards.153  
These norms were strictly customary. In fact, government laws and 
regulations enacted during the eighteenth century expressly banned dian redemption 
after eleven years, largely because prolonged dian sales tended to generate social 
tension and litigation.154 Previous surveys of local customs, contracts, and cases 
                                                 
148 ZHANG, supra note 140, at 38. 
149 LIANG ZHIPING (梁治平), QINGDAI XIGUAN FA: SHEHUI YU GUOJIA (清代习惯法:社会与国家) [QING 
CUSTOMARY LAW: SOCIETY AND STATE] 93 (1996); WU XIANGHONG (吴向红), DIAN ZHI FENGSU YU DIAN ZHI 
FALÜ (典之风俗与典之法律) [THE CUSTOMS AND LAWS REGULATING “DIAN” SALES] 35 (2009).  
150 LIANG, supra note 149; Henry McAleavy, Dien in China and Vietnam, 17 J. ASIAN ST. 403, 406-7 (1958). 
151 Zhang, supra note 130, at 161-63. 
152
 MINSHANGSHI XIGUAN DIAOCHA BAOGAOLU (民商事習慣調查報告錄) [RESEARCH REPORT ON CIVIL AND 
COMMERCIAL CUSTOMS] 505 (Sifa Xingzheng Bu ed., 1930).  
153 Id. at 161, 192-93. 
154 1 QINGDAI GE BUYUAN ZELI: QINDING HUBU ZELI (QIANLONG CHAO) (清代各部院则例:钦定户部则例(乾
隆朝) [REGULATIONS OF QING BOARDS AND MINISTRIES: IMPERIAL BOARD OF FINANCE REGULATIONS 
(QIANLONG ERA)] 83, 148-49 (Fuchi Shuyuan ed., 2004).  
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demonstrate very clearly, however, that these laws and regulations had virtually no 
effect on local contractual behavior.155 County magistrates were severely understaffed, 
underfinanced, and therefore highly reliant on the cooperation of local lineages and 
groups in even the most basic of administrative tasks.156 Therefore, when central laws 
contradicted local custom, they rarely attempted to enforce the former over the 
latter.157  
Local communities were aware of these government bans on extended dian 
redemption but generally ignored them in practice. Many wealthier landholders, 
especially those who had made dian purchases, repeatedly argued, both in local 
courts and within their village communities, that state-mandated redemption 
deadlines should take precedence over local norms of infinite redeemability.158 These 
opinions faced stiff opposition, however, from lower-income smallholders, who 
insisted that the proper norm was infinite redeemability.159 Historical evidence 
suggests that smallholders, rather than their wealthier creditors, usually carried the 
day, as communal mediation regularly enforced the right of debtors to redeem against 
unwilling creditors, even many decades after the initial dian sale.160  
As noted above, smallholders generally assembled their institutional 
preferences regarding dian sales from the position of potential or actual debtor, 
whereas wealthy households generally approached the issue as potential or actual 
creditors. But why did infinite redeemability appeal so much to debtors—and so little 
to creditors? The key to understanding this is to recognize the abnormally high value 
of land in a predominantly agrarian economy.161 This meant that smallholders very 
rarely sold or dian sold land unless forced to by negative circumstances. Selling or 
collateralizing land under conditions of financial stress generally meant, however, 
that, once the stress had passed, the seller or dian seller generally preferred to redeem 
the land if possible. This usually made him prefer mortgages to permanent sales, so 
long as the terms of the mortgage were not overly harsh. In fact, in virtually all 
surviving Qing and Republican contract archives, dian sales outnumber permanent 
sales by well over nine to one.162 Moreover, a dian seller would usually prefer an 
institutional setup that maximized his chances of successful redemption. 
                                                 
155 Zhang, supra note 130, at 168-74. 
156 See CH'U TUNG-TSU, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE CH'ING 168-92 (1962); BRADLY W. REED, 
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magistrates were highly dependent on local clerks and runners, who in turn relied on their familial and social 
ties to lubricate the daily government operations).  
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This is precisely what dian redemption customs did: because most dian sales 
were made under considerable financial stress, it was probably not in the seller’s 
interest to individually negotiate redemption terms under an institutional assumption 
of complete contractual freedom and flexibility. Doing so would allow the creditor to 
take advantage of his difficult financial circumstances to drive a hard bargain. Instead, 
he probably preferred to establish, under more neutral conditions, an a priori 
redemption deadline that covered all future dian sales in the local community. The 
range of options could theoretically extend from immediately after the dian sale to 
infinity. Among these, a blanket rule of infinite redeemability clearly offered the 
highest probability of successful redemption. 
Arguably, the only downside of this blanket rule was that, by precluding case-
by-case negotiation of redemption deadlines, it forced debtors to accept lower dian 
prices, which were only sixty to eighty percent of the land’s full value. In balance, 
this seems like a small price to pay for maximizing one’s likelihood of redemption.163 
Moreover, there were ways to negotiate higher dian prices: the seller could simply 
grant a longer guaranteed-usage period, which gave buyers greater security and larger 
returns, and therefore increased their willingness to give a larger loan.164 
All things considered, dian redemption customs were highly protective of the 
economic interests of debtors. In fact, they did so with such success that, while 
English and Japanese smallholders both lost considerable ground to larger farms 
during their respective early modern histories,165 Chinese smallholders managed to 
retain a largely stable share of arable land. During the Late Qing and Republic, for 
example, the share of land owned by the top ten percent of landholders in North 
China and the Lower Yangtze remained between thirty-five to fifty percent, with 
some prolonged periods of actual decline. Of this thirty-five to fifty percent, they 
directly managed only one-third.166 There are many reasons for this, but as previous 
                                                                                                                                     
DELTA , 1350-1988, at 106 (1990); QINGDAI NINGBO QIYUE WENSHU JIJIAO (清代宁波契约文书辑校) [QING 
CONTRACTS FROM NINGBO] (Wang Wanying ed., 2008); 3 SHICANG QIYUE (石仓契约) [Shicang Contracts] 
(Cao Shuji ed., 2010).  
163 Implicit in this statement is, of course, an assumption that the utility value of land to a farmer was so high 
that a measurable increase in the likelihood of redemption generated an expected utility gain that outweighed 
the corresponding dip in dian prices. Considering that, even with infinite redeemability, dian prices remained 
at sixty to eighty percent of full market value, this seems to be an acceptable assumption. 
164 The only hypothetical dian sellers who really lost out under the Chinese customary regime were those 
who were completely certain that they could repay within a very short period of time, but also urgently 
needed to obtain a loan worth significantly more than the percentage of full market value commonly issued 
by dian buyers. Such people were, in all likelihood, extremely rare in real life. In fact, they never emerge at 
all in previous studies on this subject. Presumably, if a potential dian seller was completely and predictably 
able to repay within a short period of time, he very rarely would have needed to make the sale in the first 
place. 
165 See sources cited supra note 144. 
166 ZHANG, supra note 140, at 174-78; Joseph W. Esherick, Number Games: A Note on Land Distribution in 
Prerevolutionary China, 7 MODERN CHINA 387, 391, 405 (1981); LI WENZHI (李文治), MINGQING SHIDAI 
FENGJIAN TUDI GUANXI DE SONGJIE (明清时代封建土地关系的松解) [THE LOOSENING OF FEUDAL LAND 
RELATIONS IN THE MING AND QING] 58 (2007); Ramon Myers, Land Distribution in Revolutionary China, 8 
THE CHUNG CHI J. 62 (1969).  
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scholarship has argued, the highly debtor-friendly nature of dian customs was 
certainly among the most important.167 
At the same time, these customs imposed serious inconvenience on creditors. 
Once the guaranteed-usage period expired, creditors could lose their usage rights in 
any year, which discouraged them from making long-term investments in the land.168 
The tremendous attractiveness of dian customs to potential land sellers also drained 
the supply of permanent land sales, as evidenced by the virtual nonexistence of 
permanent sale contracts in many existing contract archives.169 Not only was 
accumulating land via dian sales economically under-productive, but doing so also 
exacerbated the difficulty of productive permanent accumulation. 
One has to wonder why, under these conditions, dian buyers were still willing 
to issue loans equal to some sixty to eighty percent of the land’s full permanent sale 
value. There are several possible explanations. First, despite the inconveniences they 
caused, dian sales still offered significant economic value to buyers. Even if the seller 
eventually redeemed, the buyer would at least have enjoyed free use of the land for 
several years. Such use was, as noted above, usually suboptimal, but even so, land 
productivity on dian-sold land could reach some eighty percent of productivity on 
permanently owned land.170 A series of dian purchases was therefore only moderately 
less productive agriculturally than a permanent purchase of comparable physical size. 
Second, the combination of population growth, commercialization, and pre-industrial 
technological innovation during this era tended to boost land prices and intensify 
demand for land accumulation.171 At the same time, the economic predominance of 
agriculture generally meant that wealthier households had few alternative investment 
opportunities: most often, they could either let their money sit idly or acquire land, 
through any means possible. 
                                                 
167 Zhang, supra note 130.   
168 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Cost of Complex Land Titles: Two Examples from China (Yale Law & Econ., 
Research Paper No. 441, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
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169 See Zhang, supra note 130, at 187-94. 
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(Qiang Wo trans., 2004).  
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GROWTH IN PREWAR CHINA (1989) (attributing early-twentieth century growth to market integration driven by 
the foreign presence); LILLIAN M. LI, CHINA’S SILK TRADE: TRADITIONAL INDUSTRY IN THE MODERN WORLD, 
1842-1937 (1981) (positively assessing the impact of foreign trade on silk production); ROBERT PAUL 
GARDELLA, HARVESTING MOUNTAINS: FUJIAN AND THE CHINA TEA TRADE, 1757-1937 (1994) (discussing the 
growth of the tea trade after the mid-Qing). On growing land productivity, see Philip C.C. Huang, 
Development or Involution in Eighteenth-Century Britain and China?, 61 J. ASIAN STUD. 501, 512 (2002) 
(arguing that land productivity increased despite declining labor productivity). On increasing pressure from 
landlords to increase rent-levels throughout the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, see BERNHARDT, 
supra note 134.  
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Still, it is very easy to understand, given the above analysis, why dian sellers 
were often unhappy with the idea of infinite redeemability, and indeed frequently 
argued against it. They truly would have benefitted from some kind of limit on 
redemption: not only would this have limited the period of uncertainty, but more 
importantly, it would have generated a larger likelihood of dian default, thus boosting 
the supply of permanent land transactions. Theoretically, the shorter the redemption 
window, the greater these benefits would have been. In other words, the economic 
preferences of creditors directly contradicted those of debtors. It is hardly surprising, 
then, that dian redemption norms were a major source of social tension. 
What is much more surprising is that, throughout the Qing and Republic, 
customary law in China’s core macroregions consistently and almost uniformly sided 
with relatively impoverished debtors over their far more affluent creditors.172 It 
becomes even more striking when we place the institutional “victory” of Chinese 
smallholders in a comparative context: smallholders in England and Japan 
consistently and almost uniformly had to settle for mortgage institutions that were far 
less favorable, and far more conducive to the economic interests of land-
accumulating creditors. 
2. England 
From late medieval times onwards, mortgage redemption norms in England 
slowly moved against the economic interests of smallholders until, by the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, they placed debtors under such enormous economic 
pressure that many cash-strapped smallholders chose to forego the mortgage option 
and simply sell their land. This was, naturally, a welcome development for wealthier 
landholders, most of whom were accumulating large “capitalist” farms that relied 
primarily on hired labor. Correspondingly, the percentage of English farmland that 
fell under capitalist management rose from only a fraction of total arable land in the 
early fifteenth century to well over half by the end of the sixteenth.173 
The “classic mortgage” of sixteenth and seventeenth century England was a 
blunter instrument than modern Anglo-American mortgages. During that era, 
“mortgages” referred to “any arrangement whereby a loan was secured by a 
                                                 
172 This is, especially if one adheres to a Marxist view of history, a highly counterintuitive outcome. The 
notion that primitive accumulation of capital in early modern societies generally occurred via the 
dispossession and exploitation of smallholders is a central argument of Marxist historiography. See KARL 
MARX, 1 CAPITAL, ch. 31 (1867), http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/htm (last visited Dec. 
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conveyance of real property.”174 The debtor, or mortgagor, transferred either full title 
or a long term-of-years to the creditor, on the condition that the transfer would revert 
upon repayment of debt. If the mortgagor defaulted, however, he lost his right of 
redemption.  
There are several major differences between this arrangement and modern 
mortgages: first, the great majority of modern mortgages do not convey title to the 
creditor, but merely the right to be repaid from a foreclosure procedure.175 In addition, 
they often allow repayment schedules of up to several decades, generally permit the 
mortgagor to maintain possession of the property and, in cases of default, arrange 
foreclosure auctions to raise the collateral’s full market value.176 The classic 
mortgage was not nearly as lenient to mortgagors. Mortgagees were allowed to 
possess the land while waiting for repayment,177 but more importantly, local customs 
generally dictated that mortgagors must redeem within, most often, six months to a 
year, or go into default, upon which the mortgagee would obtain full, unburdened 
ownership without any additional payment.178 
Until the early eighteenth century, most English courts—common law courts, 
manor and borough courts, and so on—enforced these customary deadlines quite 
ruthlessly. They were such a major source of social tension that Chancery eventually 
felt compelled to aid beleaguered mortgagors by establishing “the equity of 
redemption,” allowing judges to extend redemption deadlines and demand 
foreclosure auctions upon final default.179 These reforms did not, however, harden 
into established doctrine until the early eighteenth century, and even then, their 
dominance over harsher common law rules was questionable.180  
All in all, compared to his counterparts in Qing and Republican China, the 
early modern English smallholder who needed to raise large sums of cash was clearly 
in much direr straights: the short and harshly enforced redemption deadlines imposed 
by customary law meant that he was under serious danger of quickly losing his 
collateral for less than full market value. Much of the time, he was actually better off 
selling the land outright, which would at least leave him with a larger sum of money. 
What is even more striking about the Sino-English comparison is that, while Chinese 
dian redemption norms remained largely stable throughout the Qing and Republic, 
English mortgage institutions became progressively harsher towards debtors over 
time. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, laws and customs still 
acknowledged the existence of “living gages” (vivum vadium)—an archaic 
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predecessor to mortgages—in which the debtor did not face any fixed deadline to 
redeem.181 Rather, the creditor would assume possession of the collateral, and some 
of the yearly produce it generated would count towards the initial debt. By the 
fifteenth century, however, this debtor-friendly instrument had been almost 
completely replaced by “mortgages” that required repayment within a very short 
term.182 The saving grace was that many local customs still guaranteed the defaulting 
debtor a foreclosure sale, so that he might at least recoup the full market value of the 
collateral.183 The debtor’s institutional position deteriorated further, however, during 
the sixteenth century, when the foreclosure sale was gradually replaced by automatic 
full conveyance to the creditor upon default.184 
The deterioration of debtor-protection in mortgage was but one part of a 
broader trend in early modern English property law. During the sixteenth century and 
later, smallholders clashed often and severely with large landowners over rent and fee 
increases, evictions, and unilateral enclosures, but generally lost out in the end.185 
Especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the wide array of legal reforms 
that wealthy households pushed through clashed intensely with what lower-income 
households considered normatively appropriate.186 Even after 1700, when enclosures 
had become so commonplace that they were no longer a major source of tension, 
higher-income households continued to pressure lower-income ones over issues such 
as gleaning rights.187 Scholars therefore regularly portray the evolution of English 
property institutions in this era as one driven by strong self-interested utilitarianism, 
if not outright class conflict.188 Wealth-based social tension and conflict played a 
major role, therefore, in the negotiation of both early modern Chinese and English 
property institutions. But while English smallholders emerged from these conflicts 
much weakened both institutionally and economically, Chinese smallholders 
somehow achieved the opposite. 
3. Japan 
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At a cursory glance, virtually all transactions on Tokugawa land markets were 
mortgages. This was because, as noted above, the Tokugawa state formally outlawed 
permanent selling of land, which forced landowners to disguise sales as ten-year 
mortgages (zyunenki shichichi nagare) that would not be redeemed and would 
convey full ownership to the creditor upon default.189 Village communities and local 
officials recognized the difference between such in-name-only mortgages and “real” 
mortgages that carried a possibility of redemption.190 Beyond these formalities, 
Japanese smallholders in need of large sums of cash faced essentially the same 
options as their Chinese or English peers: either sell land or collateralize it. 
“Real” mortgages came in two forms: kakiire, in which the debtor retained 
control of the land, and shichiire, in which the creditor assumed control until 
redemption.191 Some villages only recognized one of the two, but most seemed to 
allow both.192 Most often, land collateralized under both arrangements would forfeit 
completely to the creditor upon default.193 Alternatively, some villages allowed 
officials to hold a foreclosure sale, which at least allowed the debtor to recoup the 
land’s full market value.194 
Redemption deadlines could vary depending on the district. The most 
common custom was a uniform ten-year deadline that triggered automatic full 
conveyance to the creditor upon default.195 Other districts or villages recognized 
shorter deadlines, ranging from twenty-two months to seven years,196 and a few 
allowed the debtor as much as twenty years to repay.197 Not only did redemption 
deadlines vary from district from district, but they also fluctuated within individual 
districts. In Hanishina District, Shinano Province, for example, local customs were 
renegotiated quite often, and went from ten years before the mid-eighteenth century 
to five to ten years in the late eighteenth, to three to five by the mid-nineteenth.198 
Only in a few districts do we find anything resembling Chinese dian 
redemption rules, where debtors could redeem “at any time, no matter how long after 
the pledge was made.”199 Even in these districts, Japanese debtors were still worse off 
than their Chinese counterparts, simply because virtually all Japanese mortgages 
carried interest. Interest rates were not a major concern during the early Tokugawa 
but increased sharply from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, so much that 
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historians have often considered them a major source of social tension in the later 
Tokugawa.200 
Japanese mortgage redemption and default rules came, therefore, in a variety 
of shapes and sizes, but coalesced primarily around a model that was, effectively, a 
moderately more humane—to debtors—version of English customs. At one extreme 
were the districts that only gave debtors twenty-two months to repay and provided no 
foreclosure sale upon default. Others gave longer redemption windows, usually ten 
years, and a minority of these districts provided the financial security of a foreclosure 
sale. There was also the occasional twenty year deadline and a few localities that 
guaranteed infinite redeemability. Correspondingly, although “real” mortgages were 
quite plentiful on the Japanese land market, they did not crowd out permanent sales 
like they did in China.201 The combination of permanent sales and mortgage 
foreclosures allowed wealthier Japanese farmers to accumulate a much larger share of 
arable land during the mid to late Tokugawa—but apparently at a slower pace than 
their English counterparts—and drive large numbers of smallholders into wage 
labor.202 
Both the cross-regional variation of redemption deadlines and their 
fluctuation within single villages across time suggest that they were the product of 
regular reexamination and renegotiation. Unsurprisingly, these were often rich versus 
poor affairs, to the point where government officials came to consider land 
concentration and the institutional conflicts it provoked perhaps the major source of 
social tension during the later Tokugawa.203 Japanese smallholders did not always 
fare that badly in these negotiations, especially when compared to the plight of 
English smallholders, but, as the case of Hanishina District suggests, they nonetheless 
tended to lose ground over time.  
B. Explaining Institutional Divergence 
 
To summarize, early modern Chinese smallholders were significantly more 
successful than Japanese smallholders—and vastly more successful than English 
ones—at securing favorable mortgage institutions. The economic consequences of 
this institutional divergence were immense. At around two centuries prior to large-
scale industrialization, smallholder farmers were the dominant force in all three 
economies, both population-wise and output-wise, but only in China were they able 
to retain that position until the eve of industrialization. 
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The broad socioeconomic similarities between these societies discussed at the 
beginning of this Part severely curtail the range of plausible explanations. One might 
be tempted to suggest, for example, that wealthier Chinese landholders simply cared 
less about accumulating land than their English and Japanese counterparts, and were 
therefore more willing to compromise on mortgage institutions, but this is almost 
certainly untrue. Local Chinese court archives are well-stocked with cases in which 
large landholders begged government officials to override “backwards” or “evil” dian 
redemption customs by applying regulatory redemption deadlines.204 Republican era 
village surveys, too, present no shortage of such complaints.205 If anything, we may 
have more evidence that large landholders held very strong opinions on mortgage 
redemption from China than from either England or Japan.  
If we consider the powerful economic incentives that drove Chinese 
landholders towards aggregating large farms, it seems extremely unlikely that they 
would have “cared less” about land accumulation than their English or Japanese peers. 
By some estimates, labor productivity was more than twenty percent higher on large, 
managerial farms than on household-sized plots in North China and the Lower 
Yangtze, and the gap in animal productivity was similarly large.206 In fact, the 
historical record strongly suggests that managerial farms failed to assume greater 
importance in the rural Chinese economy only because unlimited dian redemption 
made them exceedingly hard to assemble.207 
Similarly, there is no reason to believe that Japanese or English smallholders 
had any less incentive than Chinese smallholders to fight for favorable mortgage 
redemption norms. In fact, historians have never described the creation of large farms 
in England and Japan as anything but a highly coercive process. The loss of land in 
both societies meant the loss of long-term livelihood and entrance into a volatile and 
relatively low-wage rural labor market.208 Few smallholders succumbed to such a fate 
without vigorous resistance.  
Ultimately, the broad-sweeping economic similarities between these societies 
suggest that the cause of institutional divergence was more likely one of 
sociopolitical clout than one of economic incentive: why were large Chinese 
landholders unable—rather than unwilling—to impose their institutional preferences 
on smallholders the way that their Japanese or English peers did? The historical 
evidence strongly suggests that they simply did not have the political influence to do 
so: Chinese smallholders brought more sociopolitical chips—by occupying local 
positions of authority and prestige—to the bargaining table than Japanese or English 
                                                 
204 See ZHANG, supra note 140, at 70, 202-17. 
205 Id. 
206 See JOHN LOSSING BUCK, LAND UTILIZATION IN CHINA: A STUDY OF 16,786 FARMS IN 168 LOCALITIES, AND 
38,256 FARM FAMILIES IN TWENTY-TWO PROVINCES IN CHINA, 1929-1933, at 273, 276 (1937) [hereinafter 
BUCK, LAND UTILIZATION]; BUCK, supra note 114, at 47, 53; Kenneth Pomeranz, Land Markets in Late 
Imperial and Republican China, 23 CONTINUITY & CHANGE 10, 118-19 (2008).  
207 BUCK, LAND UTILIZATION, supra note 206, at 277; see also HUANG, supra note 115, at 144-45. 
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smallholders, and were therefore more successful in securing favorable property 
institutions.209 
Compared to Japanese, and especially to English smallholders, Chinese 
smallholders generally seemed to possess far more political power. For example, in a 
collection of North China village surveys from the early 1940s, below-median 
landholders accounted for sixty-three of 128 identifiable village leadership positions, 
include village chief, vice-chief, heads of smaller administrative units, and chiefs of 
major local lineages.210 At least one village chief was virtually landless.211 This 
pattern of status distribution also seemed to exist in the Lower Yangtze and South 
China since at least the late Ming Dynasty.212 Wealth did seem to confer some 
political advantage—nine of the top thirty-five landholders in the seven North China 
villages had occupied a leadership position at some point, a significantly higher 
percentage than what we find in lower wealth tiers—but the advantage was 
modest.213 
In comparison, social histories of early modern England generally agree that 
wealthy landowners enjoyed a virtual monopoly over local political appointments. 
Surveys of English localities during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have 
repeatedly shown that recognition as a “gentleman” and the assumption of political 
authority were almost universally dependent upon the possession of substantial 
landed wealth.214 Some recent studies point out that other factors, including a 
consistent commitment to public service or long-term residency in the community, 
also influenced one’s political stature,215 but even they continue to emphasize that 
significant landed wealth was at least a prerequisite for high status.216 
Japanese smallholders, too, were largely shut out of the village political elite, 
but not quite as uniformly. Previous scholarship suggests that, although village 
headmen were almost always wealthy, in many—perhaps most—villages, at least 
some political elites were smallholders.217 Smallholders were therefore better 
“represented” politically than in the English countryside, but not nearly as well as in 
                                                 
209 The only real alternative explanation proposed by preexisting scholars is that Chinese rural communities 
often embraced “precommercial” moral ideals of “permanency in landownership”—that is, they believed that 
the permanent deprivation of land was morally wrong. See HUANG, supra note 134, at 74; MELISSA 
MACAULEY, SOCIAL POWER AND LEGAL CULTURE: LITIGATION MASTERS IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 234 (1998). 
There is, however, virtually no evidence of such moralizing. Quite the opposite, the fact that larger 
landholders were almost uniformly critical of strong dian redemption rights argues against the existence of 
any moral consensus on whether permanent land alienation was permissible. See discussion surrounding 
supra note 81.  
210 See Zhang, supra note 15, at 203-04. 
211 Id. at 204. 
212 See FENG ERKANG ET AL. (冯尔康等), ZHONGGUO ZONGZU SHI (中国宗族史) [HISTORY OF CHINESE 
LINEAGES] 318-25 (2009); INOUE TOHRU, ZHONGGUO DE ZONGZU YU GUOJIA LIZHI (中国的宗族与国家礼制) 
[CHINA’S LINEAGES AND RITUAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE] (Hang Qian trans., 2008).  
213 See Zhang, supra note 15, at 203-04. 
214 WRIGHTSON, supra note 16; French, supra note 16; E.P. Thompson, Eighteenth-Century English Society: 
Class Struggle Without Class?, 3 SOC. HIST. 133 (1978).   
215 French, supra note 16. 
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217 OOMS, supra note 17, at 166-91; SMITH, supra note 17, at 50-64; CHAMBLISS, supra note 148, at 39-41.  
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China. Some of these politically recognized smallholders were formerly rich 
households who managed to retain some of their old political stature despite 
declining economic fortunes, but others were “genuine” smallholders who regularly 
belonged to the village’s economic underclass.218 
The level of economic protection that mortgage institutions afforded 
smallholders strongly correlated, therefore, to the level of sociopolitical status the 
smallholders seemed to cumulatively possess. Smallholders occupied a large share of 
local leadership positions in Qing and Republican China. Correspondingly, they also 
enjoyed highly favorable mortgage institutions that minimized their likelihood of 
permanently losing the collateral. In comparison, English smallholders were almost 
entirely unrepresented among local political elites and also faced exceedingly harsh 
mortgage institutions that regularly led to undercompensated default and seizure. 
Japanese smallholders generally fell in-between the two extremes in both cumulative 
status and mortgage institutions. 
Although correlation is not causation, previous historical research has 
demonstrated that there is, in fact, much qualitative and circumstantial evidence, 
especially from China and England, to suggest that a causal relationship existed 
between distributions of sociopolitical status and mortgage institutions.219 The North 
China rural surveys cited above contain a number of court cases in which high 
political status smallholders utilized their political position to enforce local dian 
customs upon unhappy landlords.220 In one such case, a village chief of middling 
wealth had made a dian sale to the second wealthiest landlord in the county, who then 
attempted to impose a number of restrictions against redemption.221 The village chief 
argued that local customs did not recognize these restrictions, whereas the landlord 
sought to persuade judges that those customs were unconscionable. When the court 
declined to issue a formal judgment, the village chief mobilized a number of lower-
income village elders to put social pressure on the landlord, who eventually relented.  
Similarly, historians have long argued that the near-monopolization of 
political authority by early modern English landlords allowed them to actively 
reshape political institutions in ways that were beneficial to their economic 
interests.222 While the classic example is the evolution of tenancy institutions away 
from tenant security towards greater landlord discretion,223 the basic narrative is 
equally applicable to the gradual deterioration of debtor’s rights in mortgage 
institutions. Scholars have yet to examine whether, and to what extent, the “political 
power drives legal change” narrative applies to the specific history of Japanese 
property institutions, but in general, they have often argued, especially in recent years, 
that legal change in Japan, whether historical or contemporary, is largely driven by 
self-interested and economically motivated behavior.224 All in all, differences in 
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sociopolitical status distribution probably go a long way towards explaining the 
differences between early modern Chinese, English, and Japanese mortgage 
institutions. As political economists probably would have predicted, political “might” 
determined, or at least significantly influenced, institutional “right.” 
This is a strictly comparative explanation. Should we limit the analysis to, for 
example, China, it would be much more difficult to gauge the relative significance of 
political status vis-à-vis other potential explanatory factors. As the above analysis 
repeatedly indicates, distributions of status operated within a complex socioeconomic 
context that includes, among other factors, the relative social stability of the Chinese 
countryside, the dominance of customary law over formal law, and the 
commercialization of the rural economy. Any of these factors arguably facilitated the 
emergence of debtor-friendly dian customs. Apart from status distribution, however, 
the other factors do not really distinguish China from England and Japan, and were 
therefore unlikely to have generated institutional divergence. 
But even with that qualification, status distributions alone would still be an 
inadequate explanation for institutional divergence: status distributions do not simply 
“exist” but are necessarily shaped and influenced by other sociopolitical factors. A 
satisfactory explanation for institutional divergence must ask why Chinese, English 
and Japanese distributions of sociopolitical status differed so dramatically in the first 
place. This is the subject of Part IV. 
IV. From Culture to Status Distributions 
 
 This Part examines the first half of the “cultural norms to status distributions 
to property institutions” causation chain: the (so far) theoretical claim that status 
distributions had cultural origins. It makes, therefore, two arguments. First, it argues 
that the status distribution differences outlined in Part III stemmed from the different 
social hierarchies accepted in early modern Chinese, English, and Japanese 
societiessocieties. Second, it argues that, at least in the Chinese case, these social 
hierarchies were distinctly “cultural,” in that they were the product of widespread 
moral internalization. Similar arguments may also apply to England and Japan but are 
not explored in detail. 
A. Social Norms of Status Distribution 
  
This Section argues for the existence of well-established and fairly clear 
norms of status allocation in all three societies. In other words, each society had its 
own specific criteria by which sociopolitical authority and stature were allocated. In 
China, age and generational seniorities were, at least nominally, the dominant criteria, 
whereas English social hierarchies were largely determined by landed wealth. 
Japanese villages appeared to embrace a mixture of status determinants, including 
both landed wealth and hereditary lineage. These social hierarchies not only were 
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highly durable across time, remaining largely stable during the early modern era, but 
could also possess remarkable geographic reach. In the Chinese case, a similar set of 
basic status criteria was applied across numerous macro-regions with varying 
ecological and economic circumstances. These status criteria do an extremely 
effective job of explaining the different patterns of sociopolitical status allocation 
described in Part III. 
As an increasing number of scholars have come to realize, the most obvious 
and prevalent source of hierarchy and inequality in early modern Chinese society—
apart from the systemic patriarchal gender inequalities that existed in virtually every 
major early modern ysociety225—was the social, political and legal dominance of 
elder generations over their younger kinsmen.226 Virtually all sources of legal or 
quasi-legal regulation in Qing society, including legal codes, government regulations, 
local customs, or lineage codes of conduct, recognized systematic inequalities 
between different family members:227 parents occupied a higher socio-legal position 
than their offspring, as did uncles over nephews, and elder brothers or cousins over 
younger ones. Elder members of the household therefore dominated socioeconomic 
decision making.228 Mere disobedience or rudeness to a senior relative was a 
punishable offense. Normatively, wealth did not affect status differences within 
kinship groups. A wealthy nephew owed the same socio-legal obligations to a 
penniless uncle as a penniless nephew to a wealthy one. These kinship hierarchies 
retained much of their vitality even after the Qing state’s collapse. Republican legal 
codes narrowed the range of privileges afforded to senior relatives, but continued to 
recognize many of them.229 More importantly, the great majority of local 
communities continued to enforce traditional kinship hierarchies throughout the 
Republican era, and many do so even today.230 
                                                 
225 Women, particularly senior women, could wield significant influence over household decision making. 
However, beyond the household, their status largely depended on the status of their household patriarch.  
SHIGA SHUZO (滋贺秀三), ZHONGGUO JIAZU FA YUANLI (中国家族法原理) [THE PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW 
IN CHINA] 109-10 (Zhang Jianguo & Li Li trans., Falü Press 2003). In fact, the sociopolitical position of 
women in China seemed to decline from the medieval era (circa 900 A.D.) to the Ming and Qing dynasties, a 
process that was paralleled in England, and possibly in Japan as well. KATHRYN BERNHARDT, WOMEN AND 
PROPERTY IN CHINA 960-1949 (1999); SARA MENDELSON & PATRICIA CRAWFORD, WOMEN IN EARLY MODERN 
ENGLAND: 1550-1720 (1990); Yukata Yabuta, Rediscovering Women in Tokugawa Japan, 
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226 See, e.g., William P. Alford, The Inscrutable Occidental? Roberto Unger’s Uses and Abuses of the 
Chinese Past, 64 TEXAS L. REV. 915, 931 (1986); Avner Greif & Guido Tabellini, Cultural and Institutional 
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64 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012).  
227 See ZHANG, supra note 140, at 113-35; 8 ZHONGGUO FAZHI TONGSHI (中国法制通史) [HISTORY OF LAW IN 
CHINA, hereinafter TONGSHI] 208, 256-57, 508 (Zhang Jinfan ed., 1999). 
228 See SHUZO, supra note 225, at 40-46. 
229 See Liu Guoqiang (刘国强), Qingmo Minguo Shiqi Xingfadian Jianshe Zhong Qinshu Lunli Guanxi De 
Chuancheng Yu Biange (清末民国时期刑法典建设中亲属伦理关系的传承与变革) [Continuity and 
Change in the Treatment of Kinship Ties in Late Qing and Republican Criminal Codes], 2012(4) DAODE YU 
WENMING (道德与文明) [ENGLISH TRANSLATION] 67. 
230 FENG ERKANG (冯尔康), 18 SHIJI YILAI ZHONGGUO JIAZU DE XIANDAI ZHUANXIANG (18世纪以来中国家
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This meant that sociopolitical status in these “core” Chinese macroregions 
should, in theory, have correlated strongly with two factors: first, membership in a 
large kinship group and, second, generational and age-based seniority. While most 
local communities seemed to recognize a general gerontocratic principle that elders 
deserved respect and deference, elder relatives almost always commanded greater 
respect and deference than elder non-relatives. The highest status individuals in any 
given village should therefore have been the senior members of large kinship 
networks, especially those large and consolidated enough to constitute a major 
economic and political force. Such kinship networks did, in fact, exist in the vast 
majority of Chinese villages.231 
Strong status correlation with seniority generally meant weak correlation with 
wealth. This was simply because the life-expectancy of wealthy households in early 
modern rural China was not significantly longer than that of middling or even lower-
income ones.232 Smallholder households had only a moderately smaller chance of 
producing a high seniority individual than their wealthier neighbors. A true 
gerontocracy should therefore have produced a class of political elites that was well-
stocked with low-income but high-seniority individuals. 
These conjectures are largely borne out by historical evidence. In the North 
China surveys cited above, not only did political leadership correlate weakly with 
wealth, but it also correlated extremely strongly with generational seniority in a major 
local lineage. At least 108 of the 128 individuals belonged to the most senior 
generation of what villagers identified as a “major kinship group.”233 Only nine 
people clearly belonged to a younger generation, whereas the generational standing of 
the other eleven are unclear.234 Similarly, existing Qing and Republican lineage 
regulations from the Lower Yangtze almost uniformly listed seniority among the 
most important selection criteria for internal leadership positions. Most regulations 
                                                 
231 See KUNG-CHUAN HSIAO, RURAL CHINA: IMPERIAL CONTROL IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 326 (1960); 
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simply identified it as the most important criteria.235 Equally significantly, a large 
portion of these regulations expressly denounced selecting leaders based on wealth.236 
The early modern English countryside embraced a very different set of status 
criteria. As noted above, the dominant criteria for higher sociopolitical status was 
actually landed wealth itself.237 When and how this norm became social entrenched is 
somewhat unclear. To some extent, it was buttressed by sociopolitical reorganization 
after the Black Death,238 although significant wealth-based stratification certainly 
predated the Black Death.239 In any case, it was not until the early modern era that the 
link between status and wealth became ironclad. 
Japanese status criteria resembled English ones to some extent. In most 
Tokugawa villages, there was apparently both a general norm that political leadership 
positions were hereditary and a widely held belief that they should be held by 
relatively wealthy individuals.240 Correspondingly, when state vassals initially 
assigned village headmen and granted “titled peasant” status—which provided the 
status-holder a formal voice in village politics—in the early Tokugawa, they almost 
uniformly gave these positions to the wealthiest men in the village under the 
assumption that the positions would be hereditary.241 In theory, the official ban 
against permanent land alienation meant that the relative wealth of households would 
change relatively little over time, and therefore that political authority could be both 
hereditary and wealth-based. Lineages were important in Japanese social life but also 
appeared to select their leaders based on a mixture of wealth and inheritance 
considerations, rather than by seniority.242  
As discussed above, however, the ban against land alienation was swiftly 
circumvented in actual commercial practice, which led to the constant reshuffling of 
relative household wealth. Over time, and especially by the mid-Tokugawa, 
traditional headmen and titled-peasant households often lost their economic 
prominence to previously middling or even lower-income households.243 
Consequently, while these traditional political elite were sometimes able to retain 
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some authority by virtue of their hereditary position, they were also under regular 
pressure by “nouveau riche” households to share that authority. 
The struggle by these newly economically prominent households to gain 
political status tended to be moderately successful. With some effort, they often 
acquired positions among the village elite, sometimes at the expense of elite 
households who had fallen on very hard times, but more often simply by expanding 
the ranks of the political elite.244 Nonetheless, this was truly a struggle, and demanded 
skillful political maneuvering and coalition-building. This came in the form of 
alliances between newly rich households, but also through alliances between these 
households and smallholder or even landless households.245 
The result of all this was that, while Tokugawa village politics were largely a 
rich-dominated affair, they were also one in which poor households played some 
substantial role. The semi-hereditary nature of political stature meant that formerly 
rich households often possessed high status despite severe declines in economic 
fortunes. In addition, the political calculations of newly rich households also led to 
the political ascension of some “true” smallholder households under their patronage. 
Smallholders were, therefore, usually far less numerous within the village council 
than large landholders, and often of lower status, but could nonetheless occupy some 
share of political authority. 
To summarize, the distributions of sociopolitical status in early modern 
Chinese, English and Japanese villages were almost exactly what their status 
distribution norms and criteria would have predicted. Seniority-based kinship 
hierarchies in rural China led to gerontocracies in which senior smallholders were 
very well represented. The landholding prerequisites for high political status in 
England effectively allowed large landholders to monopolize formal sociopolitical 
authority. Finally, the mixture of wealth-based and hereditary status criteria in 
Japanese villages led to a weaker form sociopolitical dominance—but still 
dominance—by large landholders than in the English countryside. One can cite, once 
again, the “correlation is not causation” maxim, but when the stated status criteria 
correlate so well with actual status distributions, the burden must be on potential 
skeptics to identify plausible alternative explanations. 
The only alternative explanation that has drawn any serious academic 
attention is the theory that rice-growing regions tend to have a different social culture 
than wheat-growing ones: rice agriculture, due to its extremely high labor intensity 
during seeding and irrigation, is often more collaborative than wheat agriculture, 
which may incentivize rich households in rice-growing regions to treat their poorer 
neighbors more deferentially than they would in wheat-growing regions.246  
Nonetheless, this theory completely fails to explain the specific comparisons 
illustrated in this Article. North China and the Lower Yangtze had far more in 
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common than the Lower Yangtze had with Japan, despite the fact that North China 
was a wheat-growing region, whereas the other two were rice-growing regions. In 
general, smallholders had much higher cumulative sociopolitical status in North 
China than they did in Japan, which is the opposite of what the rice-wheat distinction 
would predict. Moreover, Northern Chinese social hierarchies had almost nothing in 
common with English ones, despite both being wheat-growing economies. It is far 
more likely that the sociopolitical strength of smallholders in North China and the 
Lower Yangtze derived from the seniority-based kinship hierarchies that dominated 
local society in both macroregions. 
But why did Chinese communities embrace these gerontocratic—“Confucian,” 
if you will—kinship hierarchies in the first place? The following section argues that 
the primary driving force was, to quote Ellickson, “the internalization of culture.”247 
Whether the same was true for English and Japanese status allocation norms is less 
clear, but at least one prong of the three-pronged institutional comparison made in 
this Article had distinctly “cultural” foundations.  
 
B. Cultural Internalization and Chinese Kinship Hierarchies 
 
 This Section considers how “Confucian” kinship hierarchies came to be 
embedded in Chinese society in the first place. It argues that they were at least 
partially the product of widespread moral internalization by the Chinese population. 
By and large, this claim is uncontroversial among historians. The Mainland Chinese 
historian Feng Erkang probably speaks for many when he states that Qing society 
adhered “piously” to the “collectivist” ideal that “one should make their ancestors 
proud” by closely adhering to Confucian moral values.248 The problem is that these 
are, to the critical academic eye, assumptions, and will probably fail to satisfy social 
scientists who adhere more to a rational-choice view of social institutions. This 
Article, however, presents a systematic argument—the first of its kind—for the 
widespread internalization of kinship hierarchies. 
There are three possible explanations for the social dominance of kinship 
hierarchies in Qing and Republican China. Two are largely “functionalist” or 
utilitarian, in that they focus on the pragmatic utility of kinship hierarchies, both to 
individuals and groups. First, they conveyed substantial sociopolitical or economic 
benefits on those who self-organized into kinship networks, and therefore spread and 
were sustained “organically” from the bottom up. Second, they were encouraged as a 
matter of state policy. The third, non-functionalist possibility is that kinship 
hierarchies were morally internalized on a large scale, and therefore spread simply 
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lineage building); ZHENG ZHENMAN, FAMILY LINEAGE ORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MING AND 
QING FUJIAN 286 (Michael Szonyi trans., 2000) (describing lineage organizational principles as an “ethics”); 
LI & JIANG, supra note 231, at 57-63, 111-17 (discussing possible changes in the “lineage ethics” of the 
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because people believed that they were a morally desirable or “natural” means of 
social organization. 
Common sense suggests that all three mechanisms probably coexisted to 
some extent. The more pertinent and far more difficult question is whether any of 
them were necessary conditions for the social dominance of kinship hierarchies. This 
is best answered through examining the longue durée history of kinship hierarchies. 
By the Qing and Republic, the social dominance of “Confucian” kinship hierarchies 
was stable and rarely challenged.249 For the purposes of this section, however, the 
more significant question is how they became dominant in the first place, which can 
only be answered by studying earlier eras—as early as the eleventh century—when 
kinship networks were still emerging and spreading.  
The following subsections evaluate the three major potential explanations—
bottom-up socioeconomic demand, top-down political incentivizing, and widespread 
cultural internalization—one-by-one, ultimately arguing that the basic historical 
chronology of kinship hierarchies is, in all likelihood, inexplicable if widespread 
cultural internalization did not exist. 
1. “Bottom-Up” Socioeconomic Demand 
Few would question that bottom-up socioeconomic demand played a crucial 
role. In the end, the decision to form kinship networks had to be made and 
executed—willingly—by local communities and households, not by increasingly 
remote central policymakers, and not by the moralistic urgings of Confucian scholars. 
The more challenging question is to what extent the latter two factors affected that 
decision, whether by shaping economic and political incentives, or by imposing a 
sense of moral propriety. 
Historians generally agree that, prior to the Song Dynasty, the great majority 
of large, organized kinship networks belonged to major aristocratic houses who 
dominated the central government and resided in major urban centers.250 It was not 
                                                 
249 See CHEN ZHIPING (陈支平), JIN 500 NIAN LAI FUJIAN DE JIAZU SHEHUI YU WENHUA (近 500年来福建的
家族社会与文化) [LINEAGE SOCIETY AND CULTURE IN FUJIAN OVER THE PAST 500 YEARS] (1991); FENG ET 
AL., supra note 212, at 318-25; LIN JI (林济), CHANGJIANG ZHONGYOU ZONGZU SHEHUI JI QI BIANQIAN: MING 
QING ZHI 1949 NIAN (长江中游宗族社会及其变迁：明清至 1949年) [THE LINEAGE SOCIETY OF THE 
MIDDLE YANGTZE REGION AND ITS EVOLUTION: FROM THE MING AND QING TO 1949] (1999); WANG HUNING 
(王沪宁), DANGDAI ZHONGGUO CUNLUO JIAZU WENHUA (当代中国村落家族文化) [LINEAGE CULTURE IN 
CONTEMPORARY CHINESE VILLAGES] 24 (1991); XU YANGJIE (徐扬杰), ZHONGGUO JIAZU ZHIDU SHI (中国家
族制度史) [A HISTORY OF LINEAGE INSTITUTIONS IN CHINA] 459 (1992); Tang Lixing (唐力行), 20 Shiji 
Shangbanye Zhongguo Zongzu Zuzhi de Taishi-Yi Huizhou Zongzu wei Duixiang de Lishi Kaocha (20世纪
上半叶中国宗族组织的态势-以徽州宗族为对象的历史考察) [The Trends in Chinese Lineage 
Organization in the First Half of the 20th Century—A Historical Study on the Lineages of Huizhou], 34 J. 
SHANGHAI NORMAL UNIV. 103 (2005); Yang Wanrong (杨婉荣), Shilun Minguo Shiqi Nongcun Zongzu de 
Bianqian (试论民国时期农村宗族的变迁) [On the Evolution of Rural Lineages in the Republican Era], 
2002 GUANGDONG SOC. SCI. 103.  
250 For a summary of the general narrative, see FENG ET AL., supra note 212, at 164-289; INOUE, supra note 
212; XU, supra note 249; and CHANG JIANHUA (常建华), ZONGZU ZHI (宗族志) [A HISTORY OF LINEAGES] 
(1998). For a historical periodization of lineage development, see KE CHANGJI (中国农村古代宗社史) 
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until the tenth or eleventh centuries that they began to trickle down, with limited and 
somewhat reluctant government approval,251 into the general population. Private 
lineage-formation seemed to speed up during the twelvth century in both North China 
and the Lower Yangtze, and then again after the Mongol occupation ended in the 
fourteenth century.252 By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, expansive kinship 
hierarchies were highly prevalent in North China and the Lower Yangtze and had 
begun to emerge en masse in South China as well.253 By at least the early eighteenth 
century, they were a cornerstone of social life in virtually all core Chinese 
macroregions.254 
During the Northern Song, a substantial share of lineages were created by 
new generations of high-level degree holders and officials who hoped to enshrine 
their historical legacy through lineage creation, but as time passed, kinship networks 
became more “plebian” in origin.255 The percentage of the population that held high-
level degrees plunged after the Song, and then plunged again from the Ming to the 
Qing.256 At the same time, organized kinship networks were spreading rapidly across 
the country. Inevitably, a significant majority of these kinship networks had to 
operate without any substantive ties to a jinshi degree-holder, or even a juren.  
Correspondingly, rationales for creating kinship networks tended to “descend” 
from enshrining one’s historical legacy to more straightforward calculations of 
socioeconomic utility. In any macroregion, self-organizing into large kinship 
networks conveyed some fairly obvious and significant advantages: resource sharing, 
labor pooling, better information sharing, and a stronger capacity for collective 
action—all leading to higher economic productivity, more orderly social life within 
the group, and stronger responses to external challenges.257 In particular, once a few 
established kinship networks had emerged in a region, the pressure intensified on 
other households to form their own kinship networks, or else be at a considerable 
disadvantage in all dimensions of social and economic life.258  
                                                                                                                                     
[RURAL COMMUNES IN CLASSICAL CHINESE HISTORY] (1988) (presenting a historical periodization of lineage 
development).  
251 See discussion infra pp.56-60. 
252 FENG ET AL., supra note 212; INOUE, supra note 212. 
253 FAURE, supra note 248; MAURICE FREEDMAN, CHINESE LINEAGE AND SOCIETY: FUKIEN AND KWANGTUNG 
(1966); MICHAEL SZONYI, PRACTICING KINSHIP: LINEAGE AND DESCENT IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA (2002); 
ZHENG, supra note 248, at 71-142. 
254 See CHRISTOPHER M. ISETT, STATE, PEASANT, AND MERCHANT IN QING MANCHURIA, 1644-1862 (2007).  
255 This process is discussed in, among other works, HILARY J. BEATTIE, LAND AND LINEAGE IN CHINA: A 
STUDY OF T'UNG-CH'ENG COUNTY, ANHWEI, IN THE MING AND CH'ING DYNASTIES (1979); BEVERLY J. BOSSLER, 
POWERFUL RELATIONS: KINSHIP, STATUS, AND STATE IN SUNG CHINA (1996); ROBERT H. HYMES, STATESMEN 
AND GENTLEMEN: THE ELITE OF FU-CHOU, CHIANG-HSI, IN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SUNG (1986); and 
Robert M. Hartwell, Demographic, Political, and Social Transformations of China, 42 HARV. J. ASIATIC 
STUD. 365 (1982).  
256 BENJAMIN ELMAN, A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CIVIL EXAMINATIONS IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA (2000); 
Benjamin A. Elman, Political, Social, and Cultural Reproduction via Civil Service Examinations in Late 
Imperial China, 50 J. ASIAN STUD. 77, 14-15 (1991).  
257 FAURE, supra note 248; SZONYI, supra note 253. 
258 NG CHIN-KEONG, TRADE AND SOCIETY: THE AMOY NETWORK ON THE CHINA COAST, 1683-1735, at 31 
(1983).  
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But while socioeconomic utility may explain the emergence and proliferation 
of kinship networks, it cannot explain why, by at least the later Ming, most of them 
had adopted an internal hierarchy based primarily on age and generational 
seniority.259 Utilitarian considerations actually seem to urge against adopting such 
hierarchies. Seniority-based hierarchies are so deeply non-meritocratic that their 
material functionality is highly questionable. While one may quibble about whether 
age and experience often lead to wisdom, the unavoidable fact is that there were 
vastly more effective ways of putting the most capable, however defined, people in 
charge. Educational level, economic success, popular support, and moral reputation—
any of these would have been a more reasonable proxy for leadership qualities than 
age or patrilineal proximity. There are, in fact, many signs that some kinship 
networks were seriously concerned about the amount of meritocracy within their 
internal governance structures. Many, if not most, kinship networks gave exalted 
status to people who held juren or jinshi degrees.260 Others expressed a preference for 
leaders who “possessed a good reputation among relatives,” or were “known for good 
sense and integrity.”261  
Neither of these mechanisms, however, did much to challenge straightforward 
ranking by age and generation over the long run. After the Ming, and especially 
during the Qing, higher-level degrees were extraordinarily hard to come by.262 
Consequently, at any given time, the great majority of kinship networks possessed no 
living juren or jinshi. Considerations of social reputation, on the other hand, were 
generally subsumed within the age hierarchy and only used, if at all, to differentiate 
between people of comparable seniority.263 However we look at it, Chinese kinship 
networks usually were organized around predominantly non-meritocratic principles. 
Of course, meritocracy is not always equivalent to socioeconomic efficiency. 
There are a number of potentially overriding concerns, especially political stability 
and the cost of leadership transitions. Pure meritocracy can create frequent leadership 
changes and may cause significant inefficiencies if the cost of transitioning is high—
especially when there is considerable subjectivity and room for disagreement 
involved in evaluating “merit.”264 In comparison, ranking by seniority can be a more 
objective, simpler, and therefore low-cost way of selecting leaders. But even so, this 
suggests that, at most, kinship hierarchies may have had some redeeming qualities, 
                                                 
259 FENG, supra note 230, at 95-96, 111-13, 248-56; ZHU YONG (朱勇), QINGDAI ZONGFA YANJIU (清代宗族
法研究) [STUDIES ON LINEAGE RITUALS IN THE QING] (1987).  
260 CH’U, supra note 157, at 168-80. 
261 E.g., NANJIN JIANGSHI MINFANG FAXIANG PU (南津蒋氏敏房发祥谱) [FAMILY TREE OF SOUTHERN JIN 
JIANG FAMILY MINFANG] (1890) (on file with author); SIMING ZHUSHI ZHIPU (四明朱氏支谱) [FAMILY TREE 
OF SIMING ZHU FAMILY] (1936) (on file with author); YAONAN DINGSHAN FANGSHI ZONGPU (姚南丁山方氏宗
谱) [FAMILY TREE OF YAONAN DINGSHAN FANG FAMILY] (1921) (on file with author); YONGSHANG TUSHI 
ZONGPU (甬上屠氏宗谱) [FAMILY TREE OF YONGSHANG TU FAMILY] (1919) (on file with author); BIANSHI 
ZONGPU (边氏宗谱) [FAMILY TREE OF BIAN FAMILY] (1874) (on file with author).   
262 Elman, supra note 256, at 14-15; MATTHEW H. SOMMER, SEX, LAW AND SOCIETY IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 
8 (2000) (“By the eighteenth century, all but a tiny percentage of the population could be considered free 
commoners.”).  
263 This is true of all lineage regulations cited in supra note 261.  
264 See Zhang, supra note 7. 
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and falls far short of showing that they were consistently preferable to more 
meritocratic selection. 
Quite the opposite, the long-term socioeconomic consequences of 
gerontocratic social ordering in late imperial China were very likely negative. As 
argued above, its predominance helped create and sustain a set of property 
institutions that were distinctly hostile to land accumulation by the economic elite. 
Over time, this most probably led to lower agricultural productivity, but more 
importantly, it cut off entrepreneurial families from a crucial source of capital 
accumulation, and may very well have contributed to China’s very slow pace of 
industrialization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.265  
At a more micro level, there is evidence from South China that a substantial 
minority of lineages that had amassed considerable common property during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—property that was owned by the lineage, rather 
than any specific household—became so concerned about the negative financial 
consequences that non-meritocratic governance generated that they eventually 
switched to a model where the wealthiest households in the lineage were solely 
responsible for managing the common property.266 Smallholders still retained a 
strong voice in other aspects of lineage governance but apparently recognized their 
own limitations in managing large estates.267 This suggests that the economic cost of 
ineffective leadership was often high, which may explain why, in North China and 
the Lower and Middle Yangtze, lineage ownership of common property was actually 
very limited.  
Given all this, the truly curious thing about Chinese kinship hierarchies was, 
as noted in Part II, their uniformity and consistency across highly diverse geographic, 
economic, and social terrain. During the late Ming, Qing, and Republic, a period of 
some 500 years, they were the predominant organizational principle almost 
everywhere, whether wheat-growing or rice-growing, silk-producing or cotton-
producing, mountainous or flat, humid or arid, densely populated or sparsely, interior 
or frontier.268 It is not terribly difficult to imagine some economic or ecological 
scenario where kinship hierarchies were a socioeconomically optimal institution, but 
that does nothing to explain their near-universal appeal. A society-wide phenomenon 
deserves a society-wide explanation, especially under these circumstances. As the 
previous paragraphs show, the strongly non-meritocratic nature of kinship hierarchies 
makes it extremely difficult to argue that they were almost always, or perhaps even 
frequently, socioeconomically desirable. 
If we limited our analytical timeframe to the late Qing and early Republic, we 
could plausibly argue that the longevity of non-meritocratic hierarchies derived 
simply from path-dependency or from institutional capture by smallholders. But this 
argument clearly cannot apply to the Song and Yuan, when extended kinship 
networks were still a relative novelty. In fact, for much of the Song, Yuan, and early 
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Ming, large numbers of smaller landowners and tenants still lived under fairly feudal 
conditions of personal bondage to large landlords,269 which suggests that their social 
clout and influence was probably very limited. If lower-income households received 
most of their social status from kinship hierarchies, then one has to question why 
wealthier households would agree to such hierarchies in the first place, especially 
when they often produced questionable leadership. 
The two most plausible explanations, as discussed above, are political 
incentives issued by the central government and widespread moral internalization of 
related values. Either could have provided a sufficiently powerful exogenous shock to 
generate normative uniformity across multiple and highly diverse economic 
macroregions. But was it one of the two, or both? 
2. State Policy 
The interaction between government policy and the private establishment of 
“Confucian” lineages during the Song, Ming and Qing is well-documented. 
Throughout these dynasties, the central government maintained criminal codes that, 
as discussed above, afford unequal legal status to senior and junior relatives, and 
enforced basic norms of filial piety.270 For the most part, these were straightforward 
continuations of earlier dynastic legal codes.271  
Compared to earlier dynasties, however, the Song government and its 
successors were increasingly willing to recognize the private establishment of 
extended kinship hierarchies by officials who possessed no hereditary title and, in 
later dynasties, by commoners. Pre-Song governments generally prohibited the 
establishment of kinship networks beyond a very narrow circle of hereditary nobility 
or high-level officials.272 Prior to the eleventh century, non-aristocratic officials and 
commoners were generally prohibited from engaging in systemized ancestor worship 
beyond their father and grandfather.273 Apparently, central authorities preferred that 
commoner family networks remain small, unorganized, and without the kind of social 
authority that could realistically obstruct government power.274 
In 1041, however, the Song government tentatively allowed all government 
officials, including those without any hereditary title, to engage in systemized 
ancestor worship “according to ancient rituals.”275 This sent a clear message that the 
government was interested in loosening the traditional aristocratic monopoly over 
large-scale ancestor worship and extended kinship hierarchies. By 1108, a clearer set 
of regulations had been issued, which allowed all officials of the third rank or higher 
to worship five generations of ancestors, officials of the eighth to fourth rank to 
worship three generations, and all other officials and commoners to worship two 
                                                 
269 McDermott, supra note 133. 
270 See discussion surrounding supra notes 226-230. 
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generations—that is, the patriarch’s father and grandfather.276 The construction of 
ancestral worship halls needed special permission from the emperor, and only a 
handful were authorized throughout the Song.277 
This basic legal framework went largely unchanged for several centuries, 
until the Ming.278 In 1384, following a series of petitions by local county magistrates, 
all commoners received the right to worship three generations of ancestors, which 
expanded their formally recognized kinship networks by several times, while all 
officials, regardless of rank, could worship four—and only four—generations.279  
More radical change came in 1536, when the Ming Court authorized all commoners 
and officials to worship up to five generations.280 Moreover, an unpublished internal 
document apparently required all ranked officials to construct ancestral worship 
halls.281 Commoners, on the other hand, were still formally forbidden from 
constructing ancestral halls. 
By the early Qing, the central government had gone from merely permitting 
the formation of large commoner kinship networks to actively promoting them. The 
Kangxi and Yongzheng emperors issued several edicts that praised both the 
emergence of extended kinship networks and their close adherence to “proper” 
Confucian norms of seniority and status.282 To further incentivize the creation of 
extended kinship hierarchies, the Qing government regularly granted symbolic 
economic favors to kinship networks that displayed particularly “virtuous” behavior: 
“five generations living under one roof,” for example.283  
At the same time, the government ramped up its legal efforts to recognize and 
protect lineage corporate property. Embezzlement of lineage common property was 
punishable by either temporary incarceration for minor offenses or permanent 
banishment for major ones.284 Moreover, if a lineage leader committed a criminal 
offense, whatever economic penalty the government imposed would not touch upon 
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any common property he was managing.285 Effectively, the lineage had acquired 
some degree of legal personhood. 
The Qing government’s unusual enthusiasm for private lineage formation 
may have had something to do with its unique political circumstances. Being a 
conquest dynasty, its Manchu rulers were keen to find ways of pacifying their 
predominantly Han population.286 Openly embracing “Confucian” virtues such as 
filial piety was one potentially effective way of doing this. In addition, the Qing also 
adopted an extremely laissez faire approach towards local governance, keeping its 
bureaucratic apparatus at a very small size despite rapid population growth.287 
Encouraging the formation of self-regulating kinship hierarchies may simply have 
been a way to compensate for the government’s own administrative limitations. 
Given all this, is it plausible to argue that the widespread embracement of 
Confucian kinship hierarchies by private kinship networks during the Second 
Millennium was simply a direct response to legal or economic incentives provided by 
the government? In short, probably not. First of all, the Song and Ming governments 
never actively embraced the idea that commoners should be forming their own 
extended kinship hierarchies. Rather, they seemed merely to permit it—indeed rather 
grudgingly—and their regulatory efforts generally fell far behind the actual 
proliferation of private ancestor worship in local social life.  
The Song government, as discussed above, never allowed lower-level 
officials and commoners to worship more than two generations of ancestors and 
expressly forbade them from constructing ancestor worship halls. Local documents 
indicate, however, that not only did large numbers of commoner lineages worship far 
more than two generations of ancestors, but many, perhaps most, of them had 
constructed private worship halls.288 This was increasingly the case throughout the 
Song, Yuan, and early Ming.289 Thus, when the Ming government finally allowed 
commoners to worship five generations of ancestors in 1536, it was simply belatedly 
recognizing and legitimizing what had long been an extremely common social 
practice.290 
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The Qing government was often more active in promoting private 
establishment of kinship hierarchies, but was also prone to changes of heart. In 1726, 
it issued an edict stating that large local lineages should elect a zuzheng , who would 
wield government-recognized arbitration and policing powers and could rely on local 
magistrates to help enforce his decisions.291 The rationale seemed to be that this 
would allow the state to more effectively harness the organizational capacities of 
local lineages. Within a few decades, however, it had become abundantly clear that 
this formal delegation of power simply emboldened lineages to further expand the 
scope of their self-governance, and therefore weakened government control. In 1789, 
the Qianlong emperor abolished the position entirely.292  
There are other reasons to doubt that state advocacy and encouragement had 
much to do with the continued proliferation of kinship hierarchies during the Qing. 
First and foremost, the government was, as discussed above, probably not powerful 
enough to substantively intervene with communal and lineage self-governance.293 
Perhaps reflecting the state’s limited capacity, the material incentives it offered to 
“virtuous” lineages were largely symbolic, conveying a small amount of prestige, but 
no significant economic or political benefit.294 It is hard to imagine them having more 
than a peripheral impact on the private creation of kinship hierarchies. In fact, the 
social dominance of large kinship networks was already very much secure by the 
early Qing, at least the Lower Yangtze and North China. It was still a work-in-
progress in the frontier regions of Fujian or Guangdong, but the state’s administrative 
capacity was even weaker there than in core macroregions.295 Ultimately, it seems 
unlikely that late imperial state activity really did much to directly stimulate the 
spread of kinship hierarchies. 
3. Values and Moral Internalization 
The previous two subsections have argued that socioeconomic and political 
incentives alone cannot satisfactorily explain the rapid proliferation of large kinship 
hierarchies. The inadequacy of these functionalist or utilitarian explanations suggests 
that kinship hierarchies were also sustained by some form of moral internalization, 
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Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries, 53 INT’L REV. OF SOC. HIST. 213 (2008).  
294 FENG, supra note 230, at 52. 
295 See FAURE, supra note 248; SUSAN MANN, LOCAL MERCHANTS AND THE CHINESE BUREAUCRACY, 1750-
1950 (1987); ROBERT MARKS, TIGERS, RICE, SILK, AND SILT: ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY IN LATE IMPERIAL 
SOUTH CHINA 226-48 (2006.).  
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wherein people justified seniority-based inequality through moral reasoning, rather 
than through calculations of socioeconomic welfare or political interest. To some 
extent, they had to think it was “the right thing to do.” The remainder of this section 
provides “positive” evidence that widespread moral internalization among the general 
population had probably occurred as early as the Southern Song. 
Basically, this relies on both the volume and uniformity of late imperial 
private writings on kinship relations and ancestor worship. As many have observed, 
there was an explosion, relative to immediately preceding eras, of such writings in the 
Southern Song, and again in the Ming and Qing, and then again in the early 
Republic.296 Virtually all of these writings speak of the basic principle that senior 
relatives possessed higher social status than junior ones in highly and exclusively 
moral terms. 
As with most discussions of late imperial social morality, the major Song 
Neo-Confucian scholar-officials—Zhang Zai, Cheng Yi, Zhu Xi, and so on—are a 
good place to start. Zhu Xi, in particular, zealously promoted the establishment of 
large, private kinship networks organized according to traditional Confucian seniority 
principles.297 His Northern Song predecessors uniformly believed, despite their 
otherwise deep and sometimes irreconcilable philosophical differences, that 
“privileging elders” (“zun gaonian”) was a fundamental principle of human 
morality.298 Indeed, virtually all major Song statesmen who left some written record 
at some point found it necessary or desirable to morally endorse extended kinship 
networks organized according to Confucian hierarchies and principles.299  
If we descend into the much more diverse world of non-academic private 
writings—for example, personal eulogies and lineage registries—the largely 
unconditional acceptance of kinship hierarchies continues to be a basic theme.300 The 
style and narrative focus of eulogies and registries changed considerably from the 
                                                 
296 See, e.g., FENG ET AL., supra note 212, at 195-208; LI & JIANG, supra note 231, at 32-35; BOSSLER, supra 
note 255 (focusing on the proliferation of eulogies in the Song); FEI CHENGKANG ET AL. (费成康), ZHONGGUO 
DE JIAFA ZUGUI (中国的家法族规) [FAMILY AND CLAN REGULATIONS IN CHINA] 14-25 (1998); XU (1992); 
ZHU (1987).  
297 ZHU XI (朱熹), JIALI (家禮) [FAMILY RITUALS] (Wang Yanjun & Wang Guangzhao eds., 1999).  
298 ZHANG ZAI JI (張載集) [COLLECTED WRITINGS OF ZHANG ZAI] 258-59 (Zhonghua Shuju ed., 1978); 2 ER 
CHENG JI (二程集) [COLLECTED WRITINGS OF CHENG HAO AND CHENG YI] 350-52 (Zhonghua Shuju ed., 
1981); Qiu Hansheng (邱汉生), Songmin Lixue yu Zongfa Sixiang (宋明理学与宗法思想) [Song-Ming Neo-
Confucianism and Lineage Rituals and Thought], 1979(11) LISHI YANJIU (历史研究) [HIST. STUD.] 63.  
299 On Fan Zhongyan (范仲淹), see Bian Guofeng (卞国凤), Fan Zhongyan Zongzu Fuli Sixiang Yanjiu (范
仲淹宗族福利思想研究) [A Study on Fan Zhongyan’s Thoughts on Lineage Welfare] (unpublished M.A. 
Thesis, Jilin Univ., 2004). On Wang Anshi (王安石), see Shi Yingying (石櫻櫻), Wang Anshi Jingxin yu 
Jingshi Sixiang Lunshu (王安石經心與經世思想述論) [On Wang Anshi’s Ideology of “Heart-Cultivation” 
and “Social Cultivation”] (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Pengjia Univ., 2011). On Sima Guang (司马光), see 
Ma Jialu (马加路), Sima Guang Shehui Sixiang Tanxi (司马光社会思想探析) [An Exploration of Sima 
Guang’s Social Thought] (unpublished M.A. Thesis, Qingdao Univ., 2009).  
300 See sources cited at supra note 296. 
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Tang to the Song, and underwent further changes during the Song, but the praising of 
individuals for filial obedience to elder relatives remained consistent.301 
The observations drawn above could basically be made of any late imperial 
dynasty. Ming and Qing scholars almost uniformly shared the basic conviction that 
inequality and some measure of sociopolitical dominance between senior and junior 
relatives was simply the natural order of things. For all their philosophical differences, 
Wang Yangming echoed Zhu Xi very closely when he wrote that “the different 
statuses of senior and junior relatives” had been a fundamental and self-evident 
natural principle since the age of Yao and Shun.302 Even scholars who expressly 
challenged the Neo-Confucian mainstream generally embraced these basic “human 
principles” (“renlun”): Gu Yanwu, Huang Zongxi and Wang Fuzhi during the Ming-
Qing transition, and any number of “Hanxue” advocates during the Qing.303 The 
famed contrarian intellectual Li Zhi, who relentlessly accused most Neo-Confucian 
scholars of being thorough “fakes,”304 nonetheless endorsed filial piety as a desirable 
moral principle.305 In fact, it really was not until the early twentieth century that 
serious skepticism towards kinship hierarchies began to emerge among the 
intellectual elite,306 but by then kinship hierarchies were so deeply entrenched in 
Chinese society that such skepticism had very little rural social effect until the 
Communist era.307 
Throughout these dynasties, an increasing number of kinship networks began 
compiling genealogies and internal regulations, which were natural venues for 
                                                 
301 Buddhism and Daoism did, of course, compete with Confucianism, sometimes violently, for political and 
social influence during much of the first millennium, but by the Song they had largely retreated from the 
realm of high politics, and sought out a more peaceful coexistent in local religious and cultural life. See 
RICHARD VON GLAHN, THE SINISTER WAY: THE DIVINE AND THE DEMONIC IN CHINESE RELIGIOUS CULTURE 
(2004); JACQUES GERNET, BUDDHISM IN CHINESE SOCIETY: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY FROM THE FIFTH TO THE 
TENTH CENTURIES (Franciscus Verellen trans., 1995); BAREND TER HAAR, THE WHITE LOTUS TEACHINGS IN 
CHINESE RELIGIOUS HISTORY 16-63 (1992); VALERIE HANSEN, CHANGING GODS IN MEDIEVAL CHINA, 1127-
1276 (1990).  
302 Wu Tianxia (吴天霞), Chuantong Xiaodao de Chuancheng yu Yanbian (传统孝道的传承及演变) [The 
Inheritance and Evolution of Traditional Filial Piety] (unpublished M.A. Thesis, Shaanxi Normal Univ., 2008) 
(demonstrating the basic continuity between Zhu and Wang in their ideas on filial piety and kinship 
hierarchies).  
303 Zhou Qirong (周启荣), Rujia Lijiao Sichao de Xingqi yu Qingdai Kaozheng Xue (儒家礼教思潮的兴起
与清代考证学) [The Rise of Confucian Ritualism and Evidential Scholarship of the Qing], 2011(3) NANJING 
SHIDA XUEBAO (南京师大学报) [ACADEMIC J. NANJING NORMAL UNIV.] 7. For a more general survey, see LU 
BAOQIAN (陆宝千), QINGDAI SIXIANG SHI (清代思想史) [INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF THE QING] (2009).  
304 PAULINE C. LEE, LI ZHI, CONFUCIANISM, AND THE VIRTUE OF DESIRE (2012).   
305 These writings are summarized at Shi Jiaoyu (石教余), Lun “Yiduan” Li Zhi de Chuantong Sixiang (论
“异端"李贽的传统思想) [The Traditional Thought of the “Heretic” Li Zhi], 16(2) CHONGQING ZHIYE JISHU 
XUEYUAN XUEBAO (重庆职业技术学院学报) [J. CHONGQING TECH. INST.] 78 (2007).  
306 For a general summary, see Yuan Hongtao (袁红涛), Zai “Guojia” yu “Geren” Zhijian-Lun 20 Shiji Chu 
de Zongzu Pipan (在 “国家”与“个人”之间-论 20世纪初的宗教批判) [Between “Country” and 
“Individual”-On the Criticism of Lineages in the Early 20th Century], 119 TIANFU XINLUN (天府新论) [NEW 
OPINIONS FROM SICHUAN] 119 (2004).  
307 See PRASENJIT DUARA, CULTURE, POWER AND THE STATE: RURAL NORTH CHINA, 1900-1942, at 169-73 
(1988). 
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philosophical and moral discussion on social hierarchies.308 These writings routinely 
declared that ranking kinship members by generation and age was a form of natural 
law that reached back into the distant past.309 An early Ming genealogy claimed that 
traditional Confucian hierarchies were “heavenly moral principles” (“tianlun”), and 
that those who violated them “would be annihilated by the heavens, and abandoned 
by men.”310 Similar language was epidemic in Yuan, Ming and Qing genealogies.  
As discussed at the end of Part II, one can further separate the process of 
moral or cultural internalization into the internalization of a norm itself and the 
internalization, independent of any material or political benefits, of the desire to 
“behave like the perceived sociopolitical elite.” It may be logically useful to consider 
whether the latter alone can explain the historical account presented above without 
the former occurring on a large scale. The answer is probably no: one very rarely 
finds any substantial language to this effect in the myriad of moral or intellectual 
writings surveyed above. Gerontocratic hierarchies are almost always justified 
through appeal to their innate justness and moral necessity, rather than to their 
practice by elite families. One would imagine that, if imitation was the primary 
motivation, there would be a much greater volume of local writing that attempted to 
identify the similarities between local kinship hierarchies and contemporary elite 
social practice. 
This is not to deny that elite social practice played an important role in the 
initial creation and proliferation of kinship hierarchies. As David Faure and others 
have argued, in South China, “lineage institutions spread only as government 
ideology permeated village society.”311 Local communities looked, first and foremost, 
to state and elite practice to determine what was proper and right, but this was a 
process of education, persuasion, and setting “moral examples,” not unconditional 
imitation. Within a few generations, the moral examples set by political elites came to 
acquire widespread normative authority of their own and could sustain themselves 
with or without the continuous existence of contemporary elite examples. 
C. A Note on English and Japanese Social Hierarchies 
 
If Chinese kinship hierarchies were “cultural,” could the same be said of 
England and Japan? There is, unfortunately, no clear answer to this question. The 
primary argument in favor of widespread cultural internalization in China—the 
formidable uniformity of non-meritocratic kinship hierarchies across diverse 
ecological and economic conditions—is inapplicable to England and Japan. England 
is far smaller than either China or Japan. Correspondingly, one finds far less 
economic and ecological diversity in rural England, which makes it much easier to 
accept bottom-up utilitarian narratives of norm formation.  
                                                 
308 FEI ET AL., supra note 296, at 17-25. 
309 FENG ET AL., supra note 212, at 203 (citing Chen Gao). 
310 FANG XIAORU (方孝孺), XUNZHI ZHAI JI (遜志齋集) [WRITINGS FROM XUNZHI VILLA] 34 (Xu Guangda ed., 
Ningbo Press, 2000). The quote is drawn from Zongyi Jiushou: Jin Xin [Nine Verses on Lineage Ritual: Act 
with Prudence]).  
311 FAURE, supra note 248, at 2.  
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Japan is much larger and more ecologically diverse, but its property 
institutions and social hierarchies are also considerably less uniform than their 
Chinese or English counterparts. Its customary mortgage redemption deadlines 
ranged from less than two years to a decade, and in a few cases to perpetuity.312 In 
addition, the representation of smallholders among the village political elite varied 
from village to village. The tension between hereditary status and wealth-based status 
itself probably caused much normative variation and fluctuation between and within 
Japanese villages. 
Moreover, the “non-meritocratic” accusation is much easier to lodge at 
hierarchies based on seniority than at those based on wealth. Making status dependent 
on wealth incentivizes wealth maximization and productivity growth. It also tends to 
place the most economically capable members of the community in leadership 
positions, which would intuitively benefit economic development. In other words, 
wealth-based hierarchies, like other meritocratic hierarchies, are arguably more 
desirable from a utilitarian perspective than seniority-based ones. 
Despite all this, there is nonetheless some evidence to suggest, if extremely 
tentatively, that English and Japanese social hierarchies did indeed possess a fair 
amount of moral authority. The English notion that status should depend upon landed 
wealth was generally discussed in highly moralistic terms—for example, the landed 
gentry were sometimes referred to as “those whome their race and blood or at least 
their vertues doo make noble and knowne”—that suggested at least some degree of 
internalization.313 Likewise, Japanese villagers sometimes spoke of their status 
hierarchies in somewhat reverent terms, claiming that they stemmed from titles 
granted in “the ancient past.”314 Whether these quotes are accurate reflections of 
deeper underlying sociocultural currents is an issue for another day. The Article’s 
theoretical claim was, as the reader will recall, that cultural factors could shape 
property institutions, not that they always and necessarily did so. One society out of 
three will suffice, for now. 
Conclusion 
 
This Article has argued that a cultural theory of property is necessary to 
understand some major divergences between early modern Chinese, English, and 
Japanese property institutions—that, essentially, there were “cultural paradigms” in 
the property institutions of these societies. It has demonstrated a chain of causation, at 
least in the Chinese case, from culturally internalized norms of status allocation to 
actual distributions of sociopolitical status, to the property institutions that emerged 
from bargaining between social groups of varying sociopolitical stature. By doing so, 
the Article argues that cultural factors can substantively shape and influence property 
institutions, even if people generally approach property regulation per se from a self-
                                                 
312 See discussion supra pp. 41-43.  
313 WRIGHTSON supra note 16 at 27. 
314 OOMS, supra note 17, at 214.  
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interested and utilitarian perspective. The failure to recognize this is, indeed, one of 
contemporary property theory’s major blind spots. 
Beyond these general arguments, the historical narrative also illustrates 
several finer theoretical points made in Part II. First, the persistent and powerful rich-
poor tensions that drove mortgage regulation provide yet another example of how 
property institutions are often deeply political and divisive. There was very little 
collective thinking about “general social welfare.” Instead, there was hard-nosed 
bargaining based on foreseeable economic self-interest. In addition, there were clear 
winners and losers in the bargaining process—just not always the winners and losers 
that a modern observer would intuitively expect.  
Second, the formation of Chinese dian customs vividly illustrates the often 
fundamentally different ways in which individuals approach property institutions and 
status hierarchies. The former was a decidedly utilitarian affair, whereas the latter 
was deeply moral, even religious. There is little reason to assume that the same 
behavioral assumptions about self-interest or moral internalization must apply equally 
to all human institutions. Unfortunately, the historical evidence produced here does 
not really permit a deeper inquiry into why status hierarchies were morally 
internalized, at least in China, whereas property institutions, whether Chinese, 
English, or Japanese, were apparently not. The psychological theories of childhood 
norm internalization discussed in Part II are highly plausible, but difficult to verify in 
a historical context.  
Third, the historical narrative presented here is actually highly compatible 
with conventional law and economics. Cultural factors only enter the narrative at the 
status hierarchy stage, by which point it becomes conceptually possible to subsume 
them within individual utility functions. This is a distinctly individualist account of 
cultural influence: “cultural factors” are not “operative engines” that act upon human 
society in a consolidated fashion but are, instead, influential only because individuals 
have internalized them. This methodological individualism is, in all likelihood, why 
Greif and other institutional economists have favored an internalization-based 
definition of culture over the more expansive definitions espoused by 
anthropologists.315 As Ellickson pointed out, speaking broadly of “culture” without a 
coherent theory of its individual application is incompatible with the otherwise 
individualist analysis favored by law and economics.316 This Article has attempted to 
provide both such a theory and historical evidence to support it.  
The remainder of the conclusion considers how we might apply and test the 
general theoretical claim that culture influences property institutions in post-industrial, 
modern societies and what its broader implications might be. The pre-industrial 
empirical setting of this Article conveys a number of very obvious advantages: most 
importantly, it avoids the massive wave of governmental expansion that accompanied 
large-scale industrialization in all three countries. In the Japanese and Chinese 
contexts, governmental expansion also went hand-in-hand with the attempted 
implementation of Western-influenced legal codes—German for Japan, Soviet for 
                                                 
315 See sources cited supra notes 87-90 
316 Ellickson, supra note 2, at 542. 
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China—that aimed to “modernize” or “revolutionize” traditional law and custom, 
including most areas of property law.317 The great expansion of state authority gave 
these legal transplants some actual teeth, unlike the oft-ignored, usually-circumvented 
legal codes of earlier eras.318 In other words, actual legal practice becomes much 
harder to observe once large-scale industrialization kicks in: it becomes subsumed 
under new, stronger, and linguistically foreign layers of legal authority. The relative 
simplicity and clarity of village commercial customs created through communal self-
regulation no longer existed. 
Nonetheless, the pre-industrial setting of this Article is merely empirically 
convenient, rather than theoretically necessary. There is no obvious reason to assume 
that culture matters less in contemporary societies, only that it is made more fluid and 
complex. Status hierarchies clearly continue to exist in virtually all human societies, 
and continue to vary, at least nominally, from country to country.319 It also seems 
quite plausible that they continue to exert serious influence on property institutions. 
In other words, the basic theoretical moves made in this Article are by no means 
logically specific to early modern societies. 
Some social and political theorists, particularly those writing in the post-Cold 
War decade, have suggested that a number of “modern” social forces—globalization, 
the internet, or perhaps the ideological dominance of liberal democracies—will 
eventually render “cultural” differences between societies nonexistent.320 Such 
arguments have lost, however, much of their intellectual appeal in recent years.321 In 
particular, the apparent ability of many East Asian economies to rapidly “modernize” 
their economy while retaining apparently distinct cultural, ideological, and political 
identities gives the “cultural question” examined here a strong claim to contemporary 
relevance.322 For the specific purposes of this Article, which only seeks to make a 
baseline theoretical argument, it suffices to pick the low-hanging, pre-industrial fruit 
first, but this is obviously inadequate as a long-term strategy. 
                                                 
317 See discussion surrounding supra notes 28-29. 
318 Id.  
319 For international surveys, see Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Does Social Capital Have an Economic 
Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1251 (1997), supra note 113; and Licht et al., supra 
note 58. 
320 The most (in)famous of these statements is probably FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE 
LAST MAN (1992). See also MARWAN KRAIDY, HYBRIDITY, OR THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF GLOBALIZATION 1-23 
(2005); JOHN TOMLINSON, GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE (1999).  
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HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996).  
322 This has led, in fact, to arguments that the social influence of Confucianism in East Asian societies has 
driven their economic rise. See, e.g., MICHIO MORISHIMA, WHY HAS JAPAN “SUCCEEDED”?: WESTERN 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE JAPANESE ETHOS (1982); Ming-Yih Liang, Confucianism and the East Asian Miracle, 
2 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECON. 206 (2010); Tu Wei-ming, The Rise of Industrial East Asia: The Role of 
Confucian Values, 4 COPENHAGEN J. ASIAN STUD. 81 (1989).  
Cultural Paradigms in Property Institutions 5/27/2016 7:32 PM 
 
 
 
66 
 
There are a number of ways to deal with the heightened sociolegal 
complexity brought along by modern state-building and legal transplanting. The 
obvious one is to look at the margins of government authority, at places where 
grassroots or local social forces remain strong enough to substantively curb state 
authority, and where the influence of “traditional culture” is probably strongest, and 
easiest to discern. Most often, this will be in rural areas. There is, for example, a 
growing academic literature on whether traditional kinship structures affect rural 
Chinese political and legal institutions.323 At least one such study has found that the 
existence of large, well-organized kinship networks in contemporary Chinese villages 
tend to deter against government land expropriation.324  
Of course, there is a considerable gap between these findings and the claim 
that “cultural factors” affected these institutional outcomes. As discussed in Part IV, 
kinship networks themselves are not necessarily cultural constructs—very often, they 
are simply pragmatic responses to socioeconomic challenges. What was distinctly 
“cultural” about traditional kinship networks were the status hierarchies they enforced. 
It remains to be seen whether these status hierarchies continue to play a significant 
role in the sociopolitical operation of contemporary kinship networks. 
“Margins of state authority” also exist even where the government’s general 
legal and political authority is strong and largely unchallenged: as Lawrence Lessig, 
commenting on the advent of social norms theory in law and economics during the 
1990s, once argued, one does not have to look at remote localities and under-
regulated “frontiers” to appreciate the existence of social norms that shape how legal 
institutions are applied in real life.325 Under what circumstances, for example, will an 
average urban property owner initiate litigation against, rather than informally settle 
with, a trespasser? Are there cultural undertones, however remote, to her pattern of 
decision making?  
It is not terribly difficult to imagine how a cultural examination of state 
legislation, rulemaking, or adjudication might proceed. A growing number of 
property scholars now apply political economy analysis to property regulation, 
ranging from the initial allocation of property rights to use regulations such as 
zoning.326 From there, it is but a small step to studying the influence of status 
hierarchies or other potentially cultural social norms on political preferences and 
power. Similarly, studies of judicial behavior now regularly portray judges as either 
political or self-interested, and often both.327 This, too, easily facilitates further 
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inquiries into the (potentially cultural) origins of their political leanings, or into the 
content of their perceived self-interest. 
Ultimately, there are several promising empirical strategies one can employ to 
handle the challenges posed by large-scale legal transplanting in contemporary 
societies. One could argue, in fact, that such transplanting is precisely what gives 
cultural analysis its normative significance in many contemporary societies. Given 
the tremendous amount of West-to-East legal transplanting of property law in the past 
century, a coherent account of how legal transplants are “localized” is essential to 
understanding and evaluating their transitional costs and eventual consequences. This 
Article demonstrates that, at the very least, these accounts should seriously consider 
the possible influence of local cultural factors on property use and regulation.328 
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